Tito’s Collaboration With Italians

Kingdom of Yugoslavia was an artificial creation resulting from Serb occupation of southern areas of Austria-Hungary. Croatian parts of Austria-Hungary were mostly given to Serbia, and in smaller part to Italy and Hungary.

Serb imperialists led by Nikola Pašić had already in 1916. accepted the “right” of Italy to Croatian coast, as long as Serbia itself gained access to Adriatic Sea. This was based on the London Agreement in 1915. where Britain gave Italy Croatian coast in order to entice it into joining the Entente. At the end of the war in 1918. Italy gained parts of the Croatian coast, but nowhere as much as it had wanted or been promised.

This was a major blow to Italy. In fact, Italy had entered the First World War primarily to annex Istra, Dalmatia and Albania. Because it failed to annext Dalmatia in 1918., Italy – while still officially an ally – became a dedicated enemy of the Serbian empire (“Kingdom of Yugoslavia”). After the war, Italy attempted to destroy Yugoslavia in various ways – economic blockade, diplomacy, as well as terrorist actions. Plans for destabilization of Yugoslavia were made as soon as it became obvious that all Entente powers, led by the United States, would recognize the new state.

King Alexander accepted the Rapallo agreement in 1923., which gave Italy Trst, Gorica, Gradiška and parts of Kranjska, as well as Istra and islands of Cres, Lošinj, Unije and Susak, Zadar, Lastovo, Palagruža and some uninhabited islands. Also created was a “Free State of Rijeka” which encompassed the city of Rijeka as well as parts of northeastern Istra.

One of intellectual creators of Italian Fascism, poet D’Annunzia, believed that Yugoslavia is an unnatural monstrosity that will quickly disappear. Mussolini himself, being a former socialist and an agent of British intelligence services, was trying to expand Italy to borders of the old Roman Empire. In Trst in 1920. Mussolini stated that Italy “can sacrifice 500 000 Slavic barbarians for 50 000 Italians”.

Mussolini wanted to attack Yugoslavia already in 1940., following Italy’s annexation of Albania and failed invasion of Greece in 1939. Germany however prevented this, and Yugoslavia joining the Tripartite Pact put those plans on hold until the Simović coup. When Germany broke Yugoslavia, Italy attempted to take as large portion of Yugoslavia as possible.

Attack on Yugoslavia and Greece began on 6^th April 1941., and on 8^th April Yugoslav King Peter Karađorđević escaped to London. Germany attacked Yugoslavia with 7 infantry divisions, 4 motorized divisions and 4 tank divisions, while Greece was facing 6 infantry and 2 tank divisions. Hungary deployed four corps against Yugoslavia, while Italy deployed 28 divisions and 320 aircraft. To oppose the invasion, Yugoslavia had 17 infantry divisions, 3 cavalry divisions and 700 aircraft. Greece had 20 infantry divisions and 80 aircraft. German 12^th Army crossed the border on 7^th April.

Italian advance was extremely slow despite Yugoslav resistance being essentially nonexistent. Italian mechanized units were weak and badly organized.

When German army attacked Yugoslavia on 6^th April 1941., Croatian people widely rose against the Serb totalitarianism. Three days before the invasion the air captain Vladimir Kren deserted, flying to Graz to convince Germans not to bomb Croatian cities. On the day of the attack, lieutenant Zdenko Gorjup and other Croatian pilots rebelled in air base in Macedonia. Next day, on 7^th April, Croatian patriots captured Čakovec where pharmacist Theodor Košak declared the independence of Croatia. On the same day came the rebellion of soldiers in Đakovo, Veliki Grđevac and Vaganj. Open conflict broke out between Croatian and Serb soldiers in Đakovo and Vaganj.

In Bjelovar on 8^th April, soldiers of the Yugoslav Army in retreat terrorized Croatian population, which led to Croatian elements of the army rebelling (such as the 108^th Infantry Regiment in Veliki Grđevac or 40^th Reserve Regiment in Severin). These units, with the help of the Croatian Peasant Protection, took the gendarmerie station in Garešnica and marched to Bjelovar where they gave support to mayor Julije Makanac who declared resurrection of the independent Croatian state. But because this was not done by the Ustashi, both Ustashi and the Communists covered it up because that would mean admitting that it was not only the Ustashi but Croatian people at large who wanted independent Croatia. Two days later on 10^th April 1941., in village of Donji Mosti near Bjelovar, members of 2^nd Chetnik Regiment “Emperor Dušan the Strong” murdered 11 peasants in retaliation.

When Slavko Kvaternik also declared formation of independent Croatian state in Zagreb on 10^th April 1941., many Serb gendarmes (policemen) from Gendarmerie stations rebelled and on 12^th April organized Chetnik uprising in Gračac. Yugoslav Adriatic Division, which according to plan was supposed to attack then-Italian Zadar, retreated without engaging Italian army. During the retreat, commander of the division ordered soldiers not to engage Italians, but to shoot any Croatian seen celebrating their withdrawal.

On 10^th April, captain Želimir Milić and crew of a torpedo boat rebelled in Šibenik. Following Kvaternik’s declaration of Independent State of Croatia (10^th April 1941), chief of the police and the member of Ustashi organization in homeland Marijan Nikšić decided to take over the local government. He had around 80 policemen, gendarmes and members of the state services. Yet Šibenik was a stronghold of Yugoslav Army and Navy. Local Yugoslav forces were commanded by General Živojin Pavlović, who on 12^th April withdrew towards Drniš with a portion of his forces. Italian motorized division Pasubio entered the city on 14^th April carrying Croatian flags. By 15^th April the Italian command had been set up in the city and Croatian flags replaced by Italian flags.

Certain German high officials such as Viktor von Heeren and Ernst von Weizsacker wanted to keep Yugoslavia intact but under German control. Hitler originally wanted to give Croatia to Hungary, and then thought about giving Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina to Italy. But after declaration of Independent State of Croatia on 12^th April he declared that he will not interfere into Croatian internal affairs. Still, among Germans, the only true proponents of Croatian interests were certain former Austro-Hungarian officers who saw Italy as an enemy. These officers hurried Pavelić to return to Zagreb, knowing that Vladko Maček did not accept being head of the Croatian state, and thus they feared that Hitler would give Italy majority of Croatian territory. But Pavelić decided to rely on Mussolini, not realizing that Italy was natural Croatian enemy and thus also natural Serbian ally. Mussolini for his part supported Pavelić because he feared Hitler may place somebody that he had no influence over in command of Croatia.

Initial Chetnik Activities

During April, while Croatians were organizing, Serbian soldiers, Chetniks and civilians murdered over 300 Catholics and Muslims long before first Serbian victim fell in the NDH. In fact, Serbian displeasure with Croatian state – and accompanying murders – had started already in 1939., after formation of Banate of Croatia. During that period, both the Army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as well as the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serbian Cultural Club openly supported the extremist Greater Serbian positions. Serbs immediately reinforced the two civilian paramilitary organizations, the Chetniks and the Sokols, both of which were ideologically indoctrinated, reinforced, armed and trained with help of the state. Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbs merely continued rebellious activities and transferred them from Banate onto NDH. Already in May attempt was made to begin “Đurđevdan” rebellion but it did not gather widespread support.

Increased frequence of armed Serb resistance to formation of independent Croatia led to increased repression by the state apparatus as well as retaliation by hastily formed “Wild Ustashi” militias. On 27.4.1941., Ustashi arrested and killed 176 Serbs near Bjelovar. Also began murders of former Yugoslav officers as well as better-known Serbs, which in turn led to even greater hostility of Serbs towards the new state.

Already in June 1941. Serbian forces have a formal platform of further action called “Homogenous Serbia”. This platform called for widespread genocide against Croats in order to create homogenously Serbian areas, likely aiming for the line of Karlobag – Ogulin – Karlovac – Virovitica. In order to convince Serbs to go along with this plan, Serbian Orthodox Church created a falsified document called “Valerian’s Memorandum” which was first given to German authorities in Belgrade and then spread worldwide. Already in the first version of 24^th June 1941., the Memorandum accused Croats of murdering 100 000 Serbs. Second version, from 8^th August, increases the number of murdered Serbs to 180 000, while the version published in September increased the number to 300 000. These accusations had absolutely no connection to reality, but Serbian propaganda spread them worldwide.

In the document it was alleged that all Serbs in the districts of Imotski, Gospić, Glina, Grahovo, Korenica, Gračac and many others were exterminated. Serbian Orthodox Church also claimed that Serbs were exterminated in Lapac district, despite the fact that in Lapac it was the Serbs who had begun with genocide over Croats.

Immediately following the publication of “Valerian’s Memorandum”, government of general Simović in London fell and a new Yugoslav government in exile was formed, in which Draža Mihailović became minister of the Army. Alongside the first version of “Valerian’s Memorandum”, on 23^th June, began new Serb rebellion in Croatia. Mass murders of Croats began in eastern Herzegovina, and on Vidovdan of 1941. Serbs carried out the first genocide on the territory of Independent State of Croatia. Led by the Orthodox priest Radojica Perišić, Serbs slaughtered the entire population of Avtovac, women and children included, and burned the entire settlement to the ground.

Soon in the NDH began the arrests of many Serbs which were rounded up into camps and sent towards Serbia. In total, in the next two years, some 120 000 Serbs were deported into Serbia. Due to doubts about Serb loyalty to the new state very quickly numerous anti-Serb laws were made, removing them from the government, forbidding the cyrillic and on 18.7.1941. the term “Serbian Orthodox faith” was forbidden and replaced by “Greek-Eastern faith”, a term that had been in use until 1918.

Border Negotiations

In the late April border negotiations began with Germans and Italians. In Vienna on 21^st and 22^nd April German minister Ribbentrop met with Italian minister Ciano to negotiate demarcation on the eastern shore of the Adriatic. Ciano demanded that “Dalmatia and the remaining Adriatic coast will be annexed by Italy in a stretch from Rijeka to Kotor, with Dalmatia becoming a governorate ruled by a governor. Croatia will also be closely connected to Italy through a personal union.”.

After this, on 25^th April 1941., Italian and Croatian delegations met in Ljubljana. Italian Foreign Minister Ciano demanded Italian-Croatian border to be set at the line of Karlovac – Mostar, with Italy also annexing North-Western Montenegro. North of the Karlovac – Mostar line would be Croatian state, completely independent from Italy. Ciano also stated that, should Italy and Croatia develop closer relationship, Italy would be willing to give Croatia access to the sea in the width of 30 kilometers from Kraljevica and Senj. Pavelić rejected these proposals, stating that “Should this happen, we will abandon all alliances and Italy will instead of its demands get a third war, this one against us”.

Second Italian demand left Croatia an 80 kilometer wide strip of coast below Velebit, but with demand for Croatia to enter the monetary and customs union with Italy. Pavelić rejected this as well, making a counterproposal where Italy would receive territory around Zadar and Trogir and some island. Ciano countered by proposing a economic and customs union, Italian control of all port and seaborne traffic, as well as authority over the Croatian army. Pavelić rejected this as well.

In the night of 3^rd May 1941. a telegraph sent by Kasche arrived to Berlin. It reported that Italian ambassador Casertano is demanding Pavelić’s decision on the border, customs and monetary union, and subordination of the Croatian military to Italy, and all that by 4^th May at noon. Pavelić decided to first negotiate with Germany, and thus German – Croatian border agreement was signed in Zagreb on 13^th May 1941.

Border between Croatia and Hungary was fixed to river Drava, but Pavelić did not want to accept this. But since Hitler came into support of Hungary, having promised it Međimurje and Baranja in exchange for support against Yugoslavia, these areas forcibly remained Hungarian. Agreement on Croatian borders was signed by Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs dr. Mladen Lorković and German representative Siegfried Kasche. Economic subordination of Croatia to Germany was formalized by agreement which saw Croatia allowing Germany unlimited exploitation of raw resources as well as Croatia pledging to support German units stationed on its territory. Having no support from Hitler, Pavelić had no choice but to bow to Italian demands and sign Rome agreements on 18^th May 1941. With this Italians received territory with population of 380 000 – mostly Croats – and most of the sea. After this, almost a third of people on the remaining territory of Croatia were Serbs.

Even Goebbels concluded that because of Hitler’s signing off Croatian coast to Italy, Italians had become even more brash in their demands for control of the entirety of Croatia, Montenegro and Greece. Italian demands were: creation of the customs and tax union between Italy and NDH, personal union under the Italian king, creation of the common Italo-Croatian army and Italian annexation of the wide strip of land from Rijeka to Kotor. Pavelić outright rejected the first three demands, and managed to reduce the territorial demands to only the central Dalmatia, that is, the territories that were promised to Italy by the 1915 Treaty of London. Complete rejection was simply impossible as Croatia had no army at the time while Italy had some 250 000 troops stationed within Croatian territory.

Independent State of Croatia received access to sea at the line Novi Vinodolski – Senj – Crikvenica – Karlobag – Kraljevica in the sub-Velebit littoral, as well as in the area from Omiš to Dubrovnik. Kotor with a wide belt from Boka Kotorska (Bay of Kotor) to point between Cavtat and Vitaljina was given to Italy. Croatia also retained the islands of Pag, Brač, Hvar, Šipan, Šćedro, Maon, Lokrum, Lopud, Koločep, as well as the Pelješac peninsula. Question of Split and Korčula was to be solved at a special convention as Croatia insisted on their autonomy. To avoid the personal union, Pavelić named Prince Aimone, 4^th Duke of Aosta the king od Croatia under the name of Tomislav II. But Prince Aimone was never accepted as king nor was he allowed entry to Croatia, and he himself refused to assume the kingship in protest of the Italian annexation of the Dalmatia region.

Agreements consisted of three documents. First document set the border between the two states, which gave Italy areas settled with some 380 000 Croatians. Second document was treaty by which Croatia agreed to not build military objects or keep navy in the littoral area (Second, demilitarized zone). With third document Italy became guarantor of Croatia’s political independence. Immediately after signing of the agrements, Italy divided its zone into three zones. First zone was annexed directly by Italy, second zone was demilitarized, and third zone (furthest from the sea) came under Croatian political and military control.

After signing the agreement, Pavelić in private exploded: “After we sort it out with the Serbs, we will do it with Italians too!”.

Border towards Serbia was set at 7.6.1941. at the old Austro-Hungarian border with Serbia. Eastern Srijem was formally given to Croatia, but Germany kept it under its control for strategic reasons, under name Ostsyrmien. Border towards Montenegro was decided only on 27.10.1941. in agreement with Italy, by which Italy took for Montenegro – and really for itself – part of Konavle with Prevlaka.

NDH also took the duty of supporting the Italian forces on its territory. Croatian government also gave Italian command a monetary allowance which was set for each month separately. Croatia also agreed to supply the people and the forces in the annexed areas. With the annexed areas, Italy also received significant boxite mines in Dalmatia and Herzegovina – boxite was in short supply in Italy and Germany both. As knowledge of the Italian demands spread, all of the more significant Ustashi began to resist them.

It was not long before Communists used Italian demands for their own propaganda purposes, spreading lies in order to turn people to their side. With regards to Italy, Communists most commonly spread the lie that Pavelić had sold the Dalmatia to Italy, despite the fact that the “sale” had happened in 1915 in London, and the question was “resolved” by 1921 Rapallo agreements. In order to mobilize Serbs against Croatia, Communist Partisan propaganda began spreading the lie that Ustashi are intending to kill one third of Serbs, starve to death another third and expel the final third.

During the Croatian-Italian negotiations, Serb delegations from all settlements are going to Italian commands and asking to be annexed to Italy. Delegation led by senator Novaković Longin from Knin went all the way to Rome. Even after the signing of the agreements, Serbs from Lika to Boka Kotorska kept sending delegations demanding annexation of Dalmatia and Lika. Many Serbs emigrated into Italian zone, forming councils and military camps. Italians supported this as they wanted to use Serbs to destroy Independent State of Croatia. Operational implementation of the plan was entrusted to Italian military intelligence service, while field operations were to be carried out by Serbian Chetniks and Communists. Because Communists did not begin their rebellion until the German attack on the USSR, primary agents at first were the Chetniks from Croatia. Chetniks in Serbia and Montenegro were hostile to Italians while those on the area of Independent State of Croatia propagate cooperation with Italians for the purpose of fighting against Croatia.

To try and calm the situation, Pavelić signed an agreement with Nedić about the “exchange” of population. This agreement was supposed to enable resettlement of Croats and Serbs from certain areas in order to ethnically adjust population structure and prevent conflicts. With it Milan Nedić acknowledged the legality of Independent State of Croatia, yet at the same time he with help of some German officers he began to spread propaganda about the “campaign of extermination that Pavelić was leading against the Serb people”.

NOTES:

NDH – Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska)

KPJ – Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Komunistička Partija Jugoslavije)

KPH – Communist Party of Croatia (Komunistička Partija Hrvatske)

GOG / COG – Chief Operational Group (Glavna Operacijska Grupa)

NOV and PO – People’s Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments (Narodno Oslobodilačka Vojska i Partizanski Odredi)

OZN / OZNA – Detachment for Protection of People (Odjeljenje za Zaštitu Naroda – postwar Yugoslav secret police)

Italy Supports Tito

1941

From the very start, Italians were acting as enemies of the Croatian people in spite of the supposed alliance. Only 18 days after the capitulation of Yugoslavia, between 6^th and 8^th May, rebel Serbs from villages of Kijevo and Tramošanj raised what they called the “Đurđevdan Uprising”. Serbs opened fire against the Ustashi officials near Sanski Most, and soon the Serbs from nearby villages also joined the fight. Ustashi received reinforcements from Prijedor, and on 7^th May one German detachment from 1^st Battalion of the 132^nd Regiment stationed in Prijedor also joined the fighting.

In Venetia on 15^th May 1941., Croatia signed an agreement on joining the Tripartite Pact. In May 1941. Pavelić met Hitler in Bavaria, where Hitler suggested him to lead “fifty years of ethnically intolerant policy”. Following this, in the next few months the Ustashi government deported several tens of thousands of Serbs to Serbia, and additional 120 000 in the next two years.

On 22^nd June in 3:00, Germany began the attack on the Soviet Union under name Operation Barbarossa. As a result of this, Communists in Yugoslavia received orders from the USSR to begin their rebellion.

Communists however were not the only ones who had seen their opportunity. Very quickly, Serb rebellion in eastern Herzegovina reached massive proportions. In the afternoon of 26^th June, rebel forces shot down three Croatian training aircraft. In order to inflame the rebellion, next day (27^th June) two trucks full of Italian soldiers, weapons and ammunition were sent – formally to help Croatian forces. But Chetniks were informed of this, and in an ambush near Kobilja Glava, 15 Italian soldiers were killed while the remainder surrendered. With this the Serb rebels had gained significant amounts of weapons and ammunition. Italians would continue using this way of arming the Partisans, sending weakly-protected shipments of weapons and ammunition through known rebel territories which rebels would capture with a minor loss of some low-ranking Italian soldiers.

At the beginning of the war Tito was in Zagreb, but judged that Croatians are not ready for rebellion, and that inhabitants of the western Serbia and northern Montenegro were most inclined to fight. Thus after invasion of Yugoslavia Tito went to Belgrade, where he spent time hiding in the villa of Vladimir Ribnikar on Dedinje. There he spent time doing absolutely nothing at all until German invasion of the Soviet Union. After Germans invaded the USSR, on 1.7.1941. Tito received orders from Moscow to begin the rebellion. Order was sent by radio to Zagreb, where a radio station was led by Communist agent Josip Kopnić who was a link between the Comintern and its outposts in Yugoslavia, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Greece. Directive was then sent by courier to Belgrade, where Tito received it three days later. For this reason, Tito only made a decision to start the rebellion on the meeting of Politbureau of the Centra Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CK KPJ) which was held in Belgrade on 4.7.1941. On this meeting, Tito ordered Vladimir Popović to contact Gestapo in Zagreb for help in organizing the arrival of “Spaniards”, that is, the Communist fighters from the civil war in Spain. To do so however he had to make a counteroffer to Germans, and the only offer he could make was a promise not to attack the German units. Tito explained the need for “Spaniards” as necessity to establish control over young Communists who saw them as idols, but he really needed them to help organize the uprising.

Until the beginning of the war the “Spaniards” were in the French prisons where they were interned following the loss of war in Spain. Half a year after that (23^rd August 1939) the German – Soviet Nonagression Pact was signed. Following the German occupation of France, the “Spaniards” were freed from prison camps and they volunteered for work in Germany, then a Soviet ally. Some time later they were imprisoned by Gestapo, but soon freed again, and began returning to Yugoslavia in organization of the Yugoslav Communist Party. These negotiations between Josip Broz Tito and the Germans were led by Popović and one of the “Spaniards”, Većeslav Cvetko Flores. Immediately after return the “Spaniards” took over operational control of the Partisan units. Flores joined the Partisans where he soon died under unclear circumstances – likely assassinated on Tito’s orders, as latter will not have wanted his deals with Germans to become a public knowledge.

After the meeting of Politbureau of CKKPJ on 4^th July 1941. in Belgrade made decision to begin the uprising, Milovan Đilas was sent to Montenegro to finish the preparations and lead the uprising. Armed operations were to be aimed at destruction of smaller Italian crews, cutting of supply and communication lines (such as TT – telephone / telegraph – links) and so on. Tito was not planning any larger operations. Aim was instead to use smaller attacks to provoke Italian response and repression, and use that to mobilize as many Montenegrins as possible into Partisans.

In Montenegro from 13^th July 1941 began a major Chetnik – Partisan uprising against the Italians. Uprising far exceeded the plans of the KPJ which was merely attempting to enforce its authority among the rebels. But Serbian Chetnik nationalistic forces were not prepared to subordinate themselves to Communists. Uprising itself included 32 000 men, which was 66% of the militarily able population of Montenegro excluding the major cities. Attacks were carried out using the weaponry and ammunition of the Yugoslav Royal Army which soldiers had taken to their homes and hidden following the army’s defeat and breakup. But the ammunition ran out quickly following the initial successes, and so further actions were stalled.

Italians, not expecting an uprising this strong, had only one infantry division – “Messina” – in Montenegro. Immediately following the beginning of the uprising, on 15.7. the Italian High Command sent to Montenegro five divisions from Albania, several independent units in combined strength of one division, and Albanian group “Skenderbeg”. Combined strength of these forces was 30 000 well-armed soldiers, and Chetnik-Partisan rebellion in Montenegro was quickly crushed.

During the uprising, Tito is in Belgrade, negotiating with Italian intelligence officers about cooperation. One day before the formal declaration of the uprising’s suppression, on 13^th August 1941., Tito – through Comintern agent Josip Kopinič – reported to Moscow that Italian sailors were delivering weapons to Montenegrin Communists in Kotor, despite the weapons only being delivered the next month.

But if Montenegrin partisans had been making arrangements for weapons supply with Italians on their own hand, they wouldn’t be attacking Italians with those same weapons soon after. Rather, Tito was trying to preemptively defend himself from accusations in front of Stalin, knowing he could lose his head if Stalin concluded Tito was a traitor. But Stalin did not react, and so Tito could freely cooperate with Italian Fascists under the guise of antifascism.

To prevent further rebellions, Italians decided to make agreement with Tito who was then in Belgrade and had already attempted to make contact with their intelligence agents. Italian intelligence agents led secret negotiations with Tito, whose aim was to stop Partisan attacks against the Italians and redirect them against NDH.

Tito saw that Italians were preparing a rebellion of Serbs in Lika, and recognized the Italian game. He realized that Italians were trying to conquer the entirety of the Independent State of Croatia, and that Italy was the greatest strategic enemy of NDH. Thus he concluded that he could find a common interest with Italian Fascists. Tito realized that he could use his Communist agents to help Italians in spreading the rebellion against Croatia, while Italians in turn could supply him with weapons and ammunition until the fortunes of war turned to the side of the Soviet Union. And even if they did not, if the Axis won the war, Tito will have secured the good relations with Italy and thus the place in the post-war Fascist-Nazi world. As a result of these interests and calculations, the main Yugoslav “antifascist” became the primary ally of Italian Fascists in their fight against the Independent State of Croatia.

Tito negotiated regular deliveries of weapons and ammunition, as well as Italians chasing peasants off into the forests where they could join the Partisans. Weapons and ammunition were delivered by leaving them at the prearranged locations, or alternatives the Partisans would “capture” it by attacking small outposts and transport columns with weak protection; Italian “guards” would usually run away at the first shot. Having fought in the First World War, Tito was well aware how quickly ammunition is spent in war, and thus knew that leftover weapons of the Royal Yugoslav Army and the hunting rifles were not enough for a protracted war. To get weapons from Italians he had to offer them something – and what he could offer was to help Italy in conquest of territories that Germany had given to Croatia, as well as to prevent Partisans from ever mounting serious attacks against Italian forces. Partisan attacks on German and Croatian forces could be used to create chaos, which would then allow Italians to enter Croatian-held areas under excuse of “peacekeeping”. This would allow them to gradually conquer entire Yugoslavia.

For this cooperation to succeed, it was crucial that neither the Partisan rank-and-file nor the Germans ever learned anything of it. To assure secrecy, all negotiations had to be done in person, or else by radio codes. Also agreed upon was the basic cover-up. Mussolini would use his meetings with Hitler to complain about how the Ustashi and the Home Guard are giving or surrendering weapons and ammunition to the Partisans, and Partisans themselves were also given orders to spread the same story in the terrain held by the Germans. In the Italian territory, where Croatian forces were not allowed, Partisans instead spread the myth about the “cowardly Italians” (false) who run away after brief engagement (true), leaving behind the large quantities of weapons, ammunition and other equipment (true). To help conceal the true source of the weapons and ammunition that Italians were supplying them, Partisans would write about capturing massive quantities of weapons and ammunition after literally every single battle against the Croatian (Ustashi and the Home Guard) forces, even in cases where Croatian troops lost the battle because they had literally run out of the ammunition. This agreement also created the strategy of Italians running away, leaving behind massive quantities of weapons and ammunition, whenever the majority of Partisan forces desperately needed weapons and ammunition for survival. Italians actually fought the Partisans only when they wanted to chase Partisans away from some strategically important point that had been previously controlled by Croatian or German forces.

To keep all of this a secret, Tito organized the first intelligence group in his headquarters which took care exclusively of the Italian-provided supply. Thus the partisans were now divided into the three elements: political, military and intelligence organs. First commander of the intelligence section was Rade Bulat who presented himself as Tito’s courier who merely relays Tito’s commands. Having arranged everything with the Italian and German intelligence services, Tito left Belgrade for the “Užice Republic”. Immediately afterwards, on 10^th of August 1941., Tito sent instructions to Partisan detachments concerning security questions. Main point was that “traitors should be immediately killed”. Immediately afterwards, all Partisan detachments began forming so-called “Partisan Guard”, “People’s Guard” and “People’s Militia”.

In Croatia, in the Italian organization began a major rebellion the same day that Italian garrison pulled back from Topusko, Vrginmost and Slunj according to previous agreement with Croatian government, retreating towards the shore. Serbs from surrounding villages began the uprising with Italian weapons and weapons left over from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This prevented arrival of Croatian army into the Second Zone from which Italians had to withdraw. The rebellion began in Srb, Donji Lapac, Drvar and surrounding areas. Yet in the First Zone, in the annexed area, there is no rebellion at all. Uprising was led by Chetnik leaders, and Serb rebels with 1 000 Chetniks. Leader of Chetniks in the Knin area was former Orthodox priest Momčilo Đujić, who founded the so-called Dinara Division. Leader of Serb Communists in Lika, Đorđe Đoko Jovanić, was commander of the Partisan detachment with 60 Serb Communists who joined the Chetnik uprising and ethnic cleansing of Croatian civilians. Armed with Italian weaponry, Serbian troops from annexed zone are going to Croatian areas and attacking Croatian villages. There is not a single attack on Italians, because Chetniks had received explicit orders not to attack Italian units.

Following this Chetnik uprising under Italian protection, by Mussolini’s decision all Ustashi and Home Guard units were pulled back from the Italian Second and Third occupation zones while Chetniks were integrated under Italian command and supply. To facilitate this, Italians formed MVAC – Milizia Volontare Anticommunistica. Italians signed an agreement with Chetniks, and Draža Mihailović sent his emissary Trifunović to Split as his representative in the Italian Headquarters. After this, Italians and Chetniks went into operations against Croatia under parole of war against Communism.

In the eastern Herzegovina in early August, General Dalmaco, commander of the 6^th Army Corps with headquarters in Dubrovnik, concluded that conflicts between the Serbs on one side and Croats and Muslims on the other side had advanced enough and that it is time to “bring peace”. Ignoring Croatian sovereignty, Dalmaco disarmed remaining 60 Ustashi in Trebinje, and Chetniks entered the city on 1.8.1941. At this time the first Italian – Serb agreement was signed, by which Serbs agreed not to attack Italian road and rail transports unless there are armed Croats in them. Immediately afterwards Italians concluded that they can use the conflicts to spread their occupation zone far northwards, until the line Višegrad – Jastrebarsko, taking over a third of the territory of Independent State of Croatia. With no consultation, Mussolini informed Pavelić that Italian army will occupy this area and take over the administration. Pavelić complained to Berlin, but received response that “alliance with Italy remains the Alpha and Omega of German policy in the entire Mediterranean area”.

With this expansion of the occupation zone, Italians had reinforced their position in the Balkans, hoping to – if Germany was sufficiently preoccupied in the East – conquer entire Bosnia, and then turn Croatia into their province. General Ambrosio, commander of the 2^nd Army, took over both military and civilian authority in these zones on 7.8.1941. He received nominal approval by Croatian government in form of “administrative representative”, but in reality, all military forces of the Independent State of Croatia were confined to the German zone. Official reason for renewed occupation was the need to reestablish the peace and order after the uprising in late July and to protect the area from possible British landings on the Dalmatian coast. Real reason of course was the desire to establish conditions for further northward advance and conquest of as large part of Croatia as possible, all under parole of fighting against Partisans.

While secretly negotiating with Italians, Tito was – from mid-September 1941 – also cooperating with the British. British sent him from Malta a military mission of experts for irregular warfare. British delegation was met in St. Stefan by Milovin Đilas, Arsa Jovanović and Mitar Bakić, and taken to Tito’s headquarters where they remained as Tito’s advisors. It is thus clear that arrival of the mission had been earlier planned. Draža Mihailović learned of this mission, realizing that the British were betting on multiple horses.

First delivery of Italian weapons in to Partisans happened in September 1941., when Tito’s Communists received 25 000 rifles from Italian sailors. This quantity was enough to fight against the Ustashi and the Home Guard, but insufficient for serious attacks against larger Italian units. Inteligence Service of Independent State of Croatia learned of this shipment and informed Eugen Dido Kvaternik, who reported it to Ante Pavelić. This information was forwarded to Hitler, but he concluded that it was merely a lie created by Croatian nationalists who want to cause strife between Germany and Italy. Pavelić accepted this explanation and began to increasingly sideline and harass Kvaternik, who was chief of the Ustashi law enforcement as well as the Ustashi Intelligence (UNS, Ustashi Surveillance Service). Italians also noticed Kvaternik’s activity and began to defame him to both Pavelić and Germans. Due to Italian lies, both Pavelić and Germans began to see Kvaternik as a psychopath thirsty for Serbian blood and ready to attack anyone who gets in his way. Italians thus managed to successfully interfere with UNS activity, and in 1943. UNS’ role was taken over by Gestapo, with even less success.

This first delivery was known even in Rome, and the Swiss consul wrote the following after capitulation of Italy: “Tito is perhaps the only Croat who misses Italians. This is because they had significantly contributed to supplying his Partisans with war materials.”. Swiss intelligence operatives could have easily learned of these deliveries from Italian logisticians, since Switzerland was selling Italy significant amounts of weapons and ammunition. Finding out final destination of these deliveries was not difficult. After the war, Italian general and commander of Italian Army in Croatia, Mario Roatta Chercilu, admitted that Italians had delivered to Partisans some 25 000 rifles in 1941. With this, Fascist Italians had turned antifascist Tito into the main Fascist ally in Yugoslavia.

End of the uprising in Montenegro did not suit the British, and on 20.9.1941. British officer Bill Hudson disembarked from submarine near Petrovac. As escort, he was given two Yugoslav Headquarters Majors, Zaharije Ostojić and Mirko Lalatović, who had escaped to Middle East together with the Royal government. To keep in contact, with them came radio-telegrapher Veljko Dragičević who was equipped with radio-station. After landing, he was accepted by Partisan troops and escorted to the Headquarters of Montenegro, Boka and Sanjak in the village of Radovče in the mountains of Pipera, some 15 kilometers from the Italian command in Podgorica.

Hudson informed the British Command that there were small armed groups everywhere in the area, numbering perhaps 5 000 in all. In telegram sent to SOE in Cairo on 10.10.1941., he informed about the “free people’s troops of Montenegro” whose headquarters were at Radovče. Hudson requested urgent help, noting at the same time that Montenegro was serving as the basis for supplying similar actions in Herzegovina and Sanjak, where they had no weapons. “Montenegrin liberation forces” on whom Hudson reported were in fact remnants of the Chetnik-Partisan groups that had retreated to the hills after failure of the uprising. With Italians having reestablished control over majority of cities and towns, conflicts began between the communist and nationalist groups. First Hudson’s impressions were that Communist forces were stronger and more combative, and thus he recommended that help be sent to the Communists. Again on 16.10.1941. Hudson reported how Communists were calling for uprising while nationalists were waiting. Yet immediately after Hudson’s arrival, British learned that Chetniks and Partisans were both being armed by Italians.

Italians were doing everything possible to inflame the war in Yugoslavia. Aside from using the weapons deliveries for this, they also used the media. Italian daily from Bologne, Il resto del Carlino, published in period of 18^th to 22^nd of October 1941 – the worst period of fascism – articles by Corrada Zolli in which this journalist pretended to be “shocked” by the Ustashi crimes. With such articles the Italians were trying to foster hate against Croatia among Serbs and Italians, and so Croatian crimes – while not nonexistent – were largely exaggerated and made up. Good example of this exaggeration were the reports about hundreds of thousands of people murdered in Jasenovac and other camps – between 250 000 and 700 000 just Serbs in NDH by 1943., as reported by Germans. But basic arithmetic can show why this number is false. If some 250 000 and 700 000 Serbs had been murdered by 1943, this means that by the end of the war the number will have grown to 500 000 to 1,4 million. And this is just Serbs.

In reality, combined number of victims of war in entirety of Yugoslavia from 1941 to 1945, not counting the post-war murders by Communists, is around 700 000 – and this includes Serbs, Croats, Germans, Italians and so on, people killed by the Ustashi, Germans, Italians but also by Chetniks, Partisans, Soviets, and Allied bombardments. With NDH having 42% of the prewar population of Yugoslavia, even with murder rate being twice the remaining Yugoslavia there could have been no more than 450 000 dead in NDH. Depending on total casualties in Yugoslavia – which are between 500 000 at minimum and 1 million at maximum, this number could go as low as 200 000 or as high as 700 000. According to Žerjavić, in Croatia and BiH Partisans had killed 101 000 Croats and Muslims, and Chetniks further 68 000. Partisans themselves had killed some 10 000 Serbs just in 1945., mostly Chetniks; thus 20 000 – 40 000 total Serbs killed by Partisans is not impossible, of which 10 000 – 30 000 may have been in NDH.

This means that Axis in total will have been responsible for 266 000 dead in the NDH in the median figure (that is, 266 000 out of 450 000 dead in total), with minimum being 21 000 and maximum 531 000. This number will have included both enemy combatants and the civilians. Significant number of the dead were Croats who had gone to Partisans in order to resist Italian occupation of Dalmatia (resistance which, by the way, was contrary to Tito’s desires). Therefore, ignoring the low-end figure which is completely unlikely, number of Serbs killed by the Axis (be it Germans, Italians or Croatians) in NDH cannot have been above 400 000 (assuming 531 000 dead in total), and more likely it will have been around 100 000 – 200 000. This number, as rough as it is, should clearly show that Italians were engaging in a clear campaign of defamation and psychological propaganda warfare against Croatia.

(It should be noted that the above number of 100 000 – 200 000 Serbs killed includes only those killed by the Axis – it completely ignores those killed by the Partisans or other causes. However, it includes all Serbs killed by the Axis and all causes – which is to say, it includes people killed in combat and in concentration camps, killed by Croatians, Germans or Italians).

Italians did this during the entire war, trying to inflame Serb hatred towards Croats by publishing exaggerated numbers of killed by the Ustashi – such as reports of hundreds of thousands of people killed in Jasenovac – making up crimes wholesale and so on. After the war, this Italian propaganda was adopted by Communists as an objective truth, since they were allegedly writing about their “allies”. With this media preparation, Italian 2^nd Army conquered new territories of Independent State of Croatia on 7.10.1941. General Ambrozio, commander of the Italian army, made an announcement on complete takeover of civilian and military authority. All Croatian units were disarmed and disbanded.

After calming down the situation in the annexed areas of Croatia and Montenegro, Italians decided to take some more of Croatian territory northwards by applying the strategy of “controlled chaos”, or as Romans called it, “divide et impera”. In accordance with these goals, Italians – in a secret agreement with Tito – began an operation of transferring Partisans across Sanjak into the territory of Independent State of Croatia. To fulfill this agreement, in early November 1941 a delegate of the General Headquarters and the Central Committe of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Ivan Milutinović, arrived to Montenegro. His task was to take command of, and reorganize, Partisan units in Montenegro. The Supreme Headquarters ordered one part of the Montenegrin partisans to be formed into a strong detachment of around 3 000 fighters which would be sent to Sanjak to meet Partisan forces retreating from Serbia. General Headquarters of Montenegro and Boka carried out, on 15.11., reorganization of Partisan forces and formed the nine-battalion (3 690 men) strong Montenegrin Detachment for Operations in Sanjak. This unit however was severely depleted in the unplanned attack on Pljevlja fifteen days later.

Encouraged by the previous successes, and unaware of the role Italian assistance had played in them, Montenegrin Partisans independently organized the attack on Pljevlja which began on the 1^st December 1941. despite the explicit prohibition by the Partisan General Headquarters. Tito sent his courier Rade Bulat with orders to transfer their operations to Bosnia, under explanation that Italians here were simply too strong. Because Montenegrins, unaware of the secret agreements, refused this order, Tito sent Rade Bulat with orders again – but the Montenegrins are not giving up. Because of this insubordination, Tito informed Italians of the planned attack, allowing the Italian forces to build up defences at Pljevlja. In the last-ditch effort to stop the attack, Tito sent Vojo Leković, the political commissar of the General Headquarters of the People’s Liberation Movement for Sanjak, and also the member of the Sanjak Committe. Despite his repeated explicit orders to stop the attack, the local commander and commissar stuck to their decision, believing that cancelling the attack would negatively affect the troops’ morale. Certain in the outcome, they went forward with the attack.

They were wrong. Italian garrison, consisting of 2 000 soldiers from elements of the 5^th Alpine Division “Pusteria”, easily repelled the attack by far superior force – largely thanks to having been informed of the attack in advance, as well as receiving detailed plans of the attack directly from Partisan high command. Due to heavy losses, over 2 500 partisans ran away to their houses, while remaining partisans moved to Bosnia. Once there, they, much like Chetniks, began to murder everybody who wouldn’t join their units.

In this fighting the Partisans had lost a significant portion of the weapons and equipment they had received from Italians, but these losses were soon recuperated by new deliveries. These deliveries however were made only to those Partisan forces that had shown willingness to move towards the territory of Independent State of Croatia. As a result, Partisans that had moved into Croatian territory were well-supplied, while those that had remained in Montenegro were very short on everything and were soon pushed out by the Chetniks. Supplies were delivered by the Italian Air Force to prearranged locations.

City of Pljevlje at time of the Partisan attack had a little less than 6 000 inhabitants, and was located in the valley surrounded by hills. Before the battle for Pljevlje began, between the commander of the Chetnik units in the eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina and the commander of Italian garrison in Goražde was signed an agreement on securing evacuation of the Italian forces and transfer of government to the Chetniks. This allowed withdrawal of Italian forces from Foča and Čajnik to reinforce defense of Pljevlje against attack of the Partisan Montenegrin forces. Once Italians left, Chetniks took control of Foča and Čajnik areas.

In order to additionally “motivate” the Partisans to move to territory of the Independent State of Croatia, Italians cleared Montenegro of leftover Partisans with Chetnik help. The so-called “Partisan Montenegro” disappeared under attacks of Chetnik forces in the winter of 1941 – 1942., and Chetniks – with Italian help – pushed the remaining Partisans towards Sanjak.

To cover up their own role in the Serb uprising, Italians are publically promoting Serbo-Croat cooperation, and to that end organized a meeting between the Chetnik leaders and the Ustashi. Momčilo Đujić, Pajo Popović and Brane Bogunović met Great Župan David Sinčić in Knin. Sinčić promised Đujić material and monetary help for his troops, employment of Serbs, equal division of 9,5 railway cars of grain among the Serbs and Croats. After the meeting, municipal governments in Knin, Drniš and Bosansko Grahovo were changed. Grahovo received as its mayor the pre-war municipal president, Serb Marko Kesić, who swore an oath to Poglavnik (Chief) Ante Pavelić and the Croatian State. In Knin the Deputy Mayor was Josip Laća, a friend of Đujić and Bogunović.

With the process of legalization Chetniks were declared as friends of Croatia while Partisans were considered a common enemy. This agreement calmed down the conflicts between the Chetniks and the Ustashi, and Chetniks became Italian public army for chasing Partisans northwards. Italians then secretly armed the Partisans for fighting against Italy’s public ally and real enemy, the Ustashi. In keeping with this strategy of publicly promoting peace while secretly promoting conflict, in mid-1942 the Chetniks took control in parts of northern Dalmatia. By doing this, Chetniks effectively became a buffer between the Italian-controlled areas and the areas where Partisans fought against Croatia. Legalization of Chetniks meant that many places were being defended jointly by the Italians, Chetniks, Ustashi and the Croatian Home Guard personnel. Because of this, Ustashi were helping protect many purely-Serb settlements, which weakened defenses of Croatian settlements against the Partisans. The defensive stance also gave initiative to the Partisans who could freely choose the time and the place of the attack.

To spread out Croatian forces as much as possible, Partisans used the Communist strategy of entering the depth of the enemy territory, seeking out smaller undefended settlements (villages) where they would kill everything alive, from children to the elderly. With this they forced Croatian army to defend every single settlement, even the minor ones, which spread its forces thin and prevented it from forming a concentration of forces necessary to attack larger Partisan strongholds. With any Croatian response to this strategy being insufficient – in part due to Italian interference – the Partisan territory kept spreading.

To direct the Partisan movements after the lost battle for Plevlja, Italian garrison of the “Venetia” division left Nova Varoš on 3/4 December 1941., and retreated to Bistrica, in which way they gave Partisans significant territory in which they could safely winter. Partisan units entered the abandoned Nova Varoš at noon of 4^th December, creating a large Partisan-controlled territory.

In late 1941., Partisans established weak presence in Bosnia in the area of Tuzla, Banja Luka, Sarajevo, Doboj, Gračanica, Maglaj. In response began the German preparations for Operation Ozren.

In the area of eastern Herzegovina in autumn 1941 Partisans, in cooperation with Chetniks, managed to establish control over the wide area of eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina between Drina, Bosna and Spreča. Near the end of 1941 a conflict occured between the Partisans and the Chetniks. With the arrival of Montenegrin and Serbian Partisans, the Partisans gained dominance in the area and carried out crimes against the Muslim and Catholic inhabitants who did not want to join the Partisans.

While Montenegrin Partisans are infiltrating Bosnia, Croatian Partisans are also increasingly active. On Christmas 1941 Croatian Partisans captured weakly defended Gvozdansko in Banovina. In the process, they burned a church and killed 58 civilians, citizens of Gvozdansko who had failed to run away in time.

NOTES:

NDH – Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska)

KPJ – Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Komunistička Partija Jugoslavije)

KPH – Communist Party of Croatia (Komunistička Partija Hrvatske)

GOG / COG – Chief Operational Group (Glavna Operacijska Grupa)

NOV and PO – People’s Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments (Narodno Oslobodilačka Vojska i Partizanski Odredi)

OZN / OZNA – Detachment for Protection of People (Odjeljenje za Zaštitu Naroda – postwar Yugoslav secret police)

1942

In the early 1942., before the expected Italian occupation of the areas under Chetnik control in eastern Bosnia, major Boško Todović sent a directive to his officers on 9.1.1942. in which he explained the strategy of legalization as follows: “Situation is such that at any moment the German – Italian invasion of our liberated part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia can begin, and force relations do not allow hope for successful resistance. In such a situation, and resistance would be extremely harmful for the Serbian population in this area, and also useless. Because of these factors, we will carry out timely strategic retreat with one part of our forces, while the second part will pose as Serbian Voluntary Chetnik Detachments and remain with the populace for its protection, even if forced to cooperate with the occupational forces similar to how sanitary organs, municipal governments and police do during the evacuation of territory. Partisan elders will be warned not to create unnecessary casualties among the Serb populace…”. In the public announcements, Orthodox priest Đujić pronounced to Serbs: “Dear brothers, do not be deceived by the Ustashi provocateurs and the irresponsible adventuristic elements which are inciting you to a battle against the Italian armed force… we have concluded a permanent peace.”.

In the late January 1942., Italians concluded that Partisans in the triangle Serbia – Montenegro – Croatia have also recuperated and reorganized, and so decided to push the Partisans further northeast with the help of Nedić’s Chetniks and the local Muslim militia. Before the general assault, on 1^st February 1942., Četniks and Muslim militia from Sjenice, Halilović and Mišević carried out an attack in direction of Nova Varoš (lit. New Town). General attack on Partisans began on 5^th February at 4 o’clock. At the same time the Italians, in strength of one battalion, moved from Prijepolje towards Nova Varoš, with one column moving across Bistrica and another over Kostalica so as to prevent Partisans from retreating towards Montenegro. Italians organized this operation to push the partisans towards the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and so that they themselves could push deeper towards Bosnia. Serbian-Sanjak headquarters left Nova Varoš without opposition in the evening of the 5^th February, and during the night moved to Zlatar, closer to Bosnia. Zlatar is where all Partisan units had concentrated on the 6^th February. This Italian attack was necessary because Tito did not yet have the authority necessary to move large Partisan formations in the desired direction.

Serbian – Sanjak Headquarters determined that it was impossible to winter in Zlatar, and thus decided to abandon the territory between Uvac and Lim, and moved to Kamena Gora where they reached Lim between Dico and Lučica, closer to Bosnia, and decided to winter there. Italians however wanted to push them further, and so following the reports of the arrival of Partisan units to Divce, Italians sent weak forces from Prijepolje towards Brodarevo and Koševina. They fought against the Partisans together with Croatian Muslim militia from Komaran and Chetniks during the day, and on the night of 7/8^th February all Partisan units forded the river of Lim. Partisans rested at Župa, and on 9^th February they continued towards the area of Kamena Gora where they linked up with Partisan units in western Sanjak. Crossing of Lim was good news for Tito, as Chetniks had thus approached Bosnia which was exactly where Tito wanted them. Partisan units remained in the area of Kamena Gora around ten days, and Tito disbanded the now-unnecessary Sanjak-Serb Headquarters. Following this and some minor fighting against Italians and Chetniks near Krnjača, Buča and Boljanica, Partisans moved to Čajniče in Bosnia, at the border of Bosnia and Montenegro. During this Italian operation Tito was retreating from Rominija from where Germans had pushed him, and is trying to link up with his forces coming from Montenegro.

In the early March Italians determined that they could conquer territory all the way to Sarajevo under the excuse of chasing off the Partisans, and on the conference in Opatija – from 2^nd to 3^rd March 1942. – they proposed the Operation TRIO. Planning was done jointly by members of the German, Italian and Croatian General Headquarters. Partisans would later call this operation the Third Enemy Offensive. For the offensive a special command was formed headed by German General Paul Bader. At konferences in Ljubljana, from 28^th to 29^th March, and in Sarajevo on 9^th April, it was decided that the offensive is to be carried out in three phases:

1. TRIO I – destruction of Partisan forces between Han-Pjesak, Višegrad, Goražda, Foče, Dobro Polje and Sokolac (south of Sarajevo)
2. TRIO II – in the area of Drina, around Srebrenik, Vlasenica (east of Sarajevo) and
3. TRIO III – at the Ozren mountain between Krivja, Bosna and Spreča (north of Sarajevo).

Italians alongside Chetniks were to chase Partisans northwards, while German and Croatian (Home Guard and Ustashi) forces were to set up a defensive line and prevent their escape northwards.

Plan was not liked by the Commander of the Gendermerie of NDH, Eugen Dido Kvaternik. Kvaternik already had information on Italian behind-the-scenes machinations and on them delivering weapons to Chetniks and Partisans, and from there it was easy for him to understand the Italian aims. As his complaints were ignored by Pavelić, Kvaternik began to lose faith in him despite originally having been one of his most faithful followers, willing to carry out orders no matter how immoral. Seeing the Italian plan of the attack, Kvaternik understood that Italians were aiming at annexing the territory all the way to Sarajevo if not further, while the Croatian Ustashi and Home Guard forces were to merely prevent Partisan retreat northwards.

As Croatian government was unable to buy weapons and equipment legally from either Germans – who had limited Croatian military to no more than 50 000 men – or Italians, Kvaternik began to procure weapons ilegally and in secret. He managed to buy 3 000 rifles, half of which Pavelić kept in Zagreb while the other half is sent to Sarajevo. In Sarajevo Eugen Kvaternik uses these weapons to arm the legion of Lieutenant Jure Francetić. Francetić’s unit consisted of 1500 volunteers, mostly Catholic and Muslim refugees from the Partisan-controlled territories. Francetić, without knowledge of the German commander, general Bader, left Sarajevo in the night and on the 1^st April – while Germans and Italians were still making plans – attacked Chetniks near Vlasenica from direction of Han Pijesak, quickly capturing Vlasenica. On 8^th April Francetić captured Chetnik-controlled Drinjača, and on 9^th April also took Bratunac and Srebrenica. During these actions, Black Legion also came into conflict with Partisans operating in the area.

Italians delivered plan of the operation to Tito, expecting him to pull his forces from eastern Herzegovina northwards and thus allow Italians to follow the Partisans, capturing Croatian territory without major fighting. But because local Partisans were hard to get to moving, Italians delayed the offensive operations, which allowed Eugen Dido Kvaternik and Jure Francetić to derail their scheme. Partisans, utterly caught off-guard by attack which was not supposed to begin yet, began a panicked retreat towards the Italian zone. Once there they were peacefully allowed to pass, as Italians didn’t even bother holding anything except major cities. But the Italian plans were in disarray – Partisans had moved southwards instead of northwards as they were supposed to – and Italians naturally blamed Francetić and Kvaternik. To Germans, Italians justified themselves stating that they were unable to begin operations ahead of schedule, and general Bader asked the high command to shut down the entire operation. This was accepted, but by this time German and Croatian forces from Sarajevo had already joined the operation, following the Black Legion in its advance. Black Legion itself reached Drina on 10^th April, and on 22^nd April German forces attacked Partisan units threatening Rogatica. By 27^th April the entire area of Drina had been cleansed of Chetnik and Partisan presence, with Germans capturing Chetnik commander, Major Dangić. During the fighting, large numbers of Serb civilians escaped across Drina to Serbia.

Seeing Francetić advance regardless of their plan, Italians reported that they had finished assembling division “Taurinenze” in Sarajevo field and “Alpine Hunters” in Nevesinje field. Italians advanced on 6^th April from Nevesinje towards Kalinovik, and on 1^st May began Italian advance from Sarajevo towards Kalinovik. Forces of the “Taurinenze” division captured Trnovo on 7^th April, while the elements of the “Alpine Hunters” division entered Ulog on 8^th April with no significant opposition as Partisans were well aware of the Italian routes of advance. By 12^th April, elements of both Italian divisions met each other in Kalinovik without major fighting. During this time, one reinforced regiment of the “Alpine Hunters” and elements of the division “Murge” were acting out combat against units of the North Herzegovina Partisan Detachment near Gacko and Avtovac (eastern Herzegovina near Montenegro), leaving Partisans significant quantities of weapons and ammunition to enable future operations. At the same time the elements of the “Pusteria” division entered Foča on 10^th April, from where Tito and his General Headquarters had withdrawn with no serious fighting.

In the early 1942 some 10 000 Chetniks in the Foča area defected to Partisans. As a result, Tito was strong enough in this particular area to oppose the Italians militarily – but he does not do this, and instead moves deeper into Croatian territory. In fact, Tito had detailed information about Italian plans as early as mid-March, while still in Foča, and ordered an attack on Ustashi garrison in Rogatica, east of Sarajevo. But as a result of Francetić’s offensive, he was unable to move northwards and transfer control of the now Chetnik-free area to Italians. Instead, Tito attacked Ustashi garrison in Birče, taking over control of the this particular part of eastern Bosnia and northern Montenegro. Because of the advance of the Germans and the Black Legion, Tito abandoned any further attacks against Rogatica and ordered Partisan forces retreat southwards towards Goradže and Foča. This prevented Partisan operations towards Rogatica and instead turned the operation into forced retreat of Partisan units southwards.

Italian division “Pusteria” gradually advanced on the vector Čajniče – Goražde, which Italians had taken from Partisans on 24^th April with no serious fighting. In this way Italians prevented Ustashi intrusion into this area, while at the same time leaving significant number of Partisans safe behind the Italian lines. Italian “failure” allowed the Partisans to withdraw south of the Kalinovnik – Foča line, onto Italian territory. There they were safe to rest, recuperate, resupply and reorganize under Italian protection. By the end of April, German 718^th Division reached and crossed (on 4^th May) Prača, entering Goražde on the same day, while the elements of “Pusteria” division continued towards Foča. This ended German operations in eastern Bosnia as they were not allowed to enter the Italian zone.

During the previously described battles, Italians have significantly strenghtened the Chetniks in Montenegro. Because of this, even those Montenegrin partisans that did not want to enter Croatia had to leave Montenegro. To make their retreat easier, Tito sent into assistance part of the First Proletariat Brigade on the area of Durmitore, while also sending the Second Proletariat Brigade towards Gacko (south of Foča where Italians were). In this way he ensured safe retreat towards the tripoint of Bosnia, Herzegovina and Montenegro. While this was going on, Italians pulled the “Alpine Hunters” division from the area of Kalinovik, Nevesinje and Gacko, transferring them in direction of Metković to free area for Tito and allow easier retreat of Partisan units from Montenegro. Italians justified these redeployments by citing need to reinforce the western positions at the area of Stoce, Metković, Hutovo and Ljubija, where Italians are in the second half of May, using elements of the “Murga” and “Marco” divisions as well as the Chetnik assistance, pushing remaining Partisans from this area northwards. Thanks to these Italian maneuvers, Tito managed to transfer three battalions of the First Proletariat Brigade from the area of Gacko to Golija as flank defense.

Only Italian and German forces participated in the fighting in Foča, Sanjak and Montenegro, as the Black Legion was not allowed to enter the Italian zone of control. Thanks to “heavy fighting against the Italians” in which Partisans again “captured” massive amounts of weapons and ammunition, this operation was again a major failure for Germans and Croats, but a massive success for Italians who had again opened a path for Partisans to infiltrate Croatian territory.

To help push – peacefully or by force – Partisans into Croatian territory, Italians used the elements of the divisions “Taro”, “Ferara”, “Venezia” and “Pusteria” as well as all the Montenegrin and Sanjak Chetnik forces. In order to assist Italians and more easily convince Partisans to withdraw northwards, Tito formed Sanjak Partisan units into Third Partisan Proletariat Sanjak Strike Brigade on 5^th June in Šćepan Field. This brigade was immediately transferred to an area southwest of Foča. Montenegrin Partisan detachments and the elements of the First and Second Proletariat Brigades gradually retreated across river Piva towards the mountains Maglić, Volujak and Vučevo. In this “convincing” of Partisans most active were Chetniks, for whom Italians were main providers of clothing and food.

By mid-June, offensive in Montenegro and Herzegovina has ended. German, Italian and Chetnik forces have managed to disperse Partisan units in eastern Bosnia, Montenegro and Herzegovina, with which this territory came again under Italian control. Yet Partisans are stronger than ever. With newly forbed Third Sanjak as well as Fourth and Fifth Proletariat Montenegrin Shock Brigades, and armed with Italian weapons “captured” from the Italians, now much stronger Partisans withdrew for rest and recuperation in the area of Zelengora. There they were soon joined by Herzegovina Partisan Detachment.

In the late June and early July, Tito – well-equipped with Italian weaponry and ammunition – moved northwest. Acting on Italian wishes, he began counteroffensive across the Sarajevo – Mostar railway, in the direction of Western Bosnia, and on 8.6.1942. captured Konjic. Partisan territory was also created in the area of mountain of Kozara. Kozara was extremely significant due to its location relative to Sava, Una and Vrbas traffic routes as well as due to presence of Ljubija mine, and thus attack was carried from 10^th June to 15^th July 1942.

As a consequence of this Partisan expansion, Germans and Ustashi realized that city of Banja Luka and Ljubija iron mine are in danger, and thus prepared to attack this area. Force prepared included 11 000 Wehrmacht troops, 20 000 Croatian troops (Ustashi and Home Guard), 2 000 Chetniks of Draža Mihailovich (Drenović’s and Marčetić’s groups) while Hungarians participated with five river gunboats. Germans had managed to concentrate all available free Croatian forces in this area, but this weakened them elsewhere. Partisans had some 3 000 soldiers, but mobilized or conscripted more among some 60 000 civilians in their territory.

Axis forces began a concentric assault against Partisans on 10^th June. Having surrounded the partisans, Axis troops formed wide firing zones around Kozara, and began pushing the Partisans back. This operation, known also as “Battle on Kozara” as well as “Operation Western Bosnia”, was carried out in June and July 1942 in the area of Kozara Mountain. Partisan defenders ran out of food and ammunition in ten days or so, and since Italians were not in contact and thus were unavailable for resupply, Partisans were quickly destroyed. Those Partisans that had remaned outside the encirclement attempted to break into it from the outside, in which they partially succeeded. Other Partisan units outside the enciroclement attacked the now-weakened garrisons, attempting to draw away German units from the operation, but they could not save the surrounded units. Because Italians were not participating in this operation, Partisans could not find a hole through which to escape. Because of this, they decided to carry out breakthrough on 3^rd July 1942, in southwestern part of Kozara nearby of Medveđe. Several hundred partisans and civilians managed to break out of the encirclement and run away towards Grmoč mountain. At dawn Germans introduced the armored units which closed the breach and began to clear Kozara the next day. Remnants of the partisans and civilians which had remained within the ring attempted to save themselves by hiding in the mountain. Already on the first day the Partisan hospital was destroyed, with some 300 wounded being murdered in it. German and Croatian forces spent next two weeks systematically combing Kozara and the surrounding area. According to German records, 7 938 partisans and 14 753 civilians were captured. All were transported by train to concentration camp Sajmište in Belgrade or else to Germany.

At the same time, majority of Partisans led by Tito left eastern Bosnia, moving towards western Bosnia which is where the largest Partisan-controlled territory was. As Italians were not aware of preparations for the Operation Western Bosnia, they could not inform Tito, and so he was not aware of this danger. Thus, Tito decided to move from Zelengora towards western Bosnia between late June to mid July 1942. Along the way, fighting occured around Konjica, Bugojno, Prozor, Livno and Kupres, enlarging the Partisan territory. Konjica were captured on 8.6.1942., and Mrkonjić Grad on 24 July. Campaign into Bosnian Krajina was intended by Tito to facilitate expansion of his territory in western Bosnia and create favorable conditions for further advance westwards and northwards. But due to fall of Kozara, he had to delay these plans.

While Germans and Croatians were clearing Western Bosnia from Communist presence, in Italian background general Rota is slowly carrying operations of ethnically cleansing Croatians with help of Chetniks and Partisans.

Italians began combat against Dalmatian Partisan detachment on Svilaja on 31 March 1942. The goal was to chase partisans northwards into Croatian-controlled territory. Partisans themselves provided a perfect excuse for the operation by blocking Neretva river, attacking smaller Italian motorized columns full of weapons and ammunition in areas of Makarska and Biokovo. On Hvar, Partisans attacked the gendarmerie station Bogomolja. Near Ervenik on 21 May 1942, Partisans destroyed two Italian infantry companies. Italians, instead of sending more weapons and ammunition to their isolated garrisons with stronger escort, instead replied by murdering civilians – especially in the area of Bukovica and on island of Iž. Real Italian purpose in sending weapons in weakly protected convoys was precisely to arm the Partisans, so that they would have excuse to ethnically cleanse Croatian population from that territory, and to enable Partisans to fight against the Croatian Ustashi and Home Guard forces further north. Instead of increasing protection of their supply columns, Italians increased the activity of “special courts of law”, and number of civilians interned in concentration camps is growing rapidly (concentration camps in the Italian zone such as Jadovno, Ogulin, Rab were ultimately under Italian authority). This increases resistance of population against Italians – and also their willingness to join the Partisans, who were really Italian allies, supported and armed by Italians. Thus strenghtened Partisans from newly-formed Biokovo battalion Josip Jurčević captured Vrgorac on 15^th June 1942. Upon capturing Vrgorac, Partisans immediately shot dead 33 people, mostly civilians from Vrgorac. All 350 partisans from the battalion were included in this action. Naturally, after this crime, interest of local Croatians for joining the Partisans was significantly reduced, as they don’t know if Italians or Partisans were a greater threat.

Thanks to this crime, Italians gained a good justification for ethnic cleansing and genocide of the local population. In mid-June, elements of divisions “Marche” and “Messina” carried out the operation of cleansing Biokovo from Partisans, during which populations of nine villages were killed. On 25 June 1942, combined Italian, local Home Guard and “wild Ustashi” as well as Chetnik forces attacked the 1^st Dalmatian Strike Battalion on Svilaja. On 29 June Italian mountain troops, supported by Chetniks and few local Ustashi and Home Guard troops, attacked elements of the North-Dalmatian Detachment on Promina. None of the attacks fully succeeded as Partisans always managed to escape northwards – precisely how Italians wanted it. But local village Ustashi and Home Guard forces began to understand that this was not an accident, and that the main goal of Italian operations is ethnic cleansing and murder of Croatian population, and not destruction of Partisans. For this reason they refused to participate in any further Italian-led operations, causing Italians to accuse them of being “Partisan sympathizers”.

Italian interference had made the Croatian government completely incapable of controling its own territory. Germans thus already in 1942 concluded that Croatian government was incapable of ensuring law and order in its own country. German representative in Croatia, General Glaise von Horstenau, recommended rejecting the Ustashi and formation of a more moderate government, but Hitler rejected this. And while Hitler did not understand relationship of Italians towards their “allies” the Ustashi, some Germans did understand it. Thus the German diplomat Edmund Veesenmayer, commenting on the relations between NDH (Independent State of Croatia) and Italy, in one report wrote that “Italy was clearly not interested in well-governed and independent Croatia. Using all available means, Italy is not attempting to create conditions which will permanently make NDH unlivable.”.

In the rear in early July 1942., Italians are using every single incident for revenge actions against Croats. Italian units reported to their command that they had killed 800 Croatian and Slovenian civilians in the area of Rijeka, and burned 20 houses near Split on the shore.

As many partisans had returned south after Francetić’s action, Roata has a major issue. He no longer has a formal reason for northward advance under excuse of chasing the partisans. He thus concluded that partisans should be left sufficient space for reorganization and resupply with new weapons and manpower to allow them new push northwards after reinforcement. To facilitate this he opted for a limited withdrawal, allowing the Partisans to form a new partisan-controlled territory where they could rest and resupply. Using this temporary retreat to calm down Pavelić, Roata on 12.7.1942. signed a new agreement with the Ustashi government, and during the summer pulled back nearly half of his forces from Zones II and III. Withdrawal was carried out rapidly to prevent the Ustashi and the Home Guard from taking over and using the abandoned infrastructure. It was also carried out with no conflict with either Partisans or Chetniks, and Italians left behind large quantities of weapons and ammunition – and on Udbina air field, they even left tanks and aircraft. All of this was picked up by Partisans, who also used Italian withdrawal to form their republic – exactly as Italians had desired.

In the area of Croatian Littoral, Italians had chased off Croatian Ustashi and Home Guard garrisons, and then decided to also chase off the Partisans who did not want to move northwards to fight against the Ustashi and the Home Guard troops. With this goal in mind, Italians began operation “Risnjak” on 12.7.1942. in the rear area of Rijeka with 12 000 soldiers – same day when they had suddenly begun withdrawing from the area north of the area towards which they were chasing the Partisans. In this specific area Italians were at something of a disadvantage, as there were no Chetniks willing to do their dirty business, and Partisans themselves were also unwilling to murder “kulaks” for no reason, and so the operation of ethnically cleansing Croatian population fell onto Italians themselves. Unlike the usual Italian habit of only using roads to allow Partisans route of escape, this time Italians truly were chase Partisans away from the area and get them moving northwards. For this reason, Italian infantry advance through dense forests completely surprised the Partisans who were not expecting such behavior from Italian forces. While formal goal of the operation was to chase away and destroy the Partisans, the true goal was to capture as much Croatian (NDH) territory as possible, while destroying or expelling as much Croatian population as possible. Partisans, along with newly-mobilized fighters from the refugee population, withdrew deeper into Croatian territory. In mid-July the Italian Air Force reported destroying four “Yugoslav” villages and killing hundreds of civilians in response to a terrorist attack which killed two high-ranking Italian Army officers.

In the Dinara area, Italians began the attack from 10^th to 13^th July with the official goal of destroying the local Partisan units and the 4^th Operational Zone headquarters. Employing 5 and half battalions of infantry, armor and artillery from divisions “Sassari” and “Bergamo”, along with few smaller units of Chetniks and gendarmerie, Italians pushed Partisans northwards as the latter were never completely surrounded to begin with. On Biokovo, Partisan battalion “Jozo Jurčević” after few days escaped the encirclement.

On 16^th July, Italians – 7 battalions and an artillery battalion – as well as Chetniks from “Dinara division”, with air support, attacked elements of the North Dalmatian and 3^rd Lika Detachments in the area of source of River Zrmanja. Italian attack pushed the Partisans and Chetniks in northwesterly direction, towards Srb, as Italians again did not surround the “enemy”.

While Italians are burning Croatian villages to chase as many people as possible into hands of the Partisans, Partisans themselves managed to – on 5./6.8.1942. – capture Croatian garrison in Livno after heavy fighting in which some 200 inhabitants of Livno perished. With this they rounded off their territory. Next day Partisans murdered 120 captured Ustashi and several dozen members of the local government in Franciscan monastery in Gorica.

As Ustashi were defending Kupres from several times more numerous Partisans, Italians determined that Partisans now had enough territory in the north and thus could be pushed out of eastern Herzegovina. In agreement with Italians, on 19^th August 1942. Mihailović ordered his Chetnik forces to attack Foča, which was held by Croatian and German forces at the time and whom Italians wanted gone from the place. Following the Chetnik capture of Foča and slaughter of nearly thousand civilians, Italian troops entered the place with no resistance, preventing the Croatian counterattack. With this, Foča came again under Italian control.

Following the successful defense of Kupres by the Ustashi, Italians had realized that the Black Legion was ruining all their plans. Because of this, Italians accused the Black Legion of various heinous crimes against Italian allies the Chetniks as well as the civilians. Because of these accusations, German communications officers recommended their commander, general Fortner, that Black Legion should be disbanded as these (made up) crimes are harming German and Croatian interests. Fortner disagreed with this assessment, but in order to keep good relations with Italians, he ordered disarmament and arrest of members of one company of the Black Legion which had intended to attack Romanija on their own initiative, and also arrested Francetić on 25 August.

Since Partisans had appeared in Dalmatia again, Italians decided to again start operation against the Partisans – operation which would, naturally, displace even more civilians into Bosnia. This operation was named “Albia”. In the operation “Albia” the official Italian goal was to destroy the Partisans in the Biokovo area. Preparatory operations began on 11.8.1942., by deploying division “Bergamo” in the area of Cista Provo and Lovreć with the goal of separating the First Proletariat Brigade from the Biokovo detachment “Josip Jurčević” (which returned to Biokovo). Several villages were burned down during this operations, with population escaping to the mountains where it was mobilized by the Partisans. Elements of the “Messina” division began deploying on 16.8. from southeast in the direction Vrgorac – Metković – Ploče – Zaostrog to prevent Partisans from escaping towards Dubrovnik, while escape onto the islands was being prevented by the Italian navy. During this deployment as well many villages were devastated, with population being forced to run away into the mountains and join the Partisans. Six villages were burned down and 200 civilians killed by the Italians. Artillery and aviation participated in this operation, and on 27 August partisans withdrew towards the Sv. Jure (Saint Jure) mountain top in order to secure the retreat into Bosnia.

By order of the zone command, on 29 August some 650 partisans sneaked through weakened and dispersed Italian positions near village of Grabovac towards Aržan. One company, in smaller groups, moved to eastern Biokovo while 20 partisans were left behind with the goal of mobilizing new fighters and forming new Partisan units. Final attack began on 29.8. and lasted until 3.9.1942. when remaining Partisans had escaped from the area of Biokovo mountain. In this final phase the primary role was played by five Chetnik battalions which moved from Stolac over Ljubuško and Imotski, reaching Croatian shore near Makarska. Italians had transported them in 33 trucks. In only 17 hours, 17 Croatian villages were burned down and completely destroyed. Croats from these villages ran away into Partisans who were thus significantly strenghtened.

During the Chetnik advance of 29 August 1942, 141 civilians were massacred in the past-Biokovo villages of Rašćane, Kozica, Dragljane and Župa, among whom three Catholic priests. Speed of the Chetnik advance indicates that there were no real conflicts with the Partisans. Majority of Chetniks were advancing at forced march, with smaller units occasionally separating on Italian trucks and burning Croatian villages. Italians and Chetniks were both quite satisfied – a large number of Croatian villages had been destroyed, and Chetniks had reached the Adriatic Sea. Biokovo Partisans, having lost volunteers after their capture of Vrgorac and slaughter of all of the well-off civilians in Vrgorac, suddenly gained a windfall of new volunteers thanks to this Italian operation. These volunteers were promptly armed with Italians weapons. Newly recruited Partisans were promptly removed from Biokovo and sent to fight against NDH in central Bosnia, which was the true goal of this Italian operation. At Biokovo the Partisans left only a few reliable Communists tasked with mobilization of civilians that were hiding from Italians. After the operation, general Rata wrote: “Operations against the Communist rebels of Biokovo, carried out by brave troops of divisions “Bergamo” and “Messina” as well as formations of the anticommunist volunteer militia under our command which on this day were victoriously concluded, following several days of heavy fighting, had been led and had developed in a truly excellent manner. Tenacious resistance of the prepared and well-armed enemy, major difficulties due to impassable terrain, could not stop the zest, nor affect bravery of the units. Achieved results were such that the enemy formations can be considered destroyed…”. Nearly everything written here was a lie (there had been no heavy fighting, no resistance by the Partisans, and Partisan formations were nearly unaffected), yet Rata truly had reason for celebration. Partisans, nearly intact, had been pushed northwards – precisely as Italians had wanted.

During this operation, Italians also had similar operation of chasing population into Partisans and then northwards in Slovenia. But since there they didn’t have Chetniks as scouts, they had to do it themselves, destroying 100 villages and killing 7 000 people.

Following the withdrawal of Italian forces from Biokovo, remaining Partisans again gathered in the area of hamlet of Šošići, mobilizing the peasants who had escaped the villages destroyed by Italians – Kozice, Dragljani, Ravča, Kljenak, Rašćani, Župa, Zagvozd and so on. Using weapons provided by the Italians, on 15.8.1942. Partisans formed these recruits into a new battalion “Josip Jurčević”, numbering a total of 160 partisans.

In mid-1942, Italian Fascist general Mario Roatta armed the Chetnik units in eastern Herzegovina, Montenegro, western Bosnia and Dalmatia. This Roatta’s move angered Croatian and German military authorities. Germans interpreted this as Roatta preparing the terrain for Italy joining the Allies, not understanding that Roata was merely using the Chetniks to cause conflict and kill as many Croats and Serbs as possible in the territory that was to be annexed by Italy. Roata-Pavelić agreement of 19.7.1942. saw Pavelić recognize the Anticommunist Volunteer Militia for “fighting against the Partisans and their allies”. Pavelić was likely hoping to turn Serbs in allies for fighting against the Partisans. In reality, this agreement provided Italians with loyal local forces ready to carry out bloody crimes and mass murders aimed against Croatian civilian population.

As Partisans had more and more soldiers, weapons and ammunition despite all the anti-Partisan operations, Pavelić on 13 September 1942 arranged with Germans and Italians operation “Dinara”, which also included a number of smaller operations against Partisans in Bosnia. In the first part of the operation, codenamed “Alpha”, plan was to destroy some 14 000 Partisans which had reappeared in the Jajce – Glamoč – Livno – Donji Vakuf area. Italians entrusted the main attack against Partisan to Chetniks, but, realizing that Partisans could in fact be destroyed here, Italians themselves delayed with joining the fighting, leaving operations to Chetnik forces as well as the Ustashi units that were advancing from the opposite direction. Inclusion of the Ustashi into the operation led to argument between the Chetniks and the Italian General Roata. Roata himself is attempting to keep formally good relations with everyone so he could continue advancing the Italian agenda. Partisans surrendered Prozor to Chetniks and Italians with no resistance on 14.7.1942., and by 8.10. are escaping in the direction of Gornji Vakuf and Rostovo. By 10^th October, Italian and Chetnik forces are advancing northwards through Mostar, taking Prozor, Šćit and Ravno – which all then came under Italian control. Chetniks used this opportunity to massacre some 2 000 Catholics and Muslims, which caused Croatian government to protest to Italy – to no effect. Italians had in fact intentionally sent Chetniks to carry out the massacre which was planned in advance, with the goal of causing exodus of people from the area – refugees which could then be mobilized by the Partisans, and those that weren’t would still stress the Croatian government with necessity of organizing relief efforts.

Despite protests by Croatian government, in the second part of the Dinara operation – called Operation Beta – Italians carried out the operation from 20 to 27.10.1942. in order to capture Livno alongside Chetniks. From 23 October onwards Partisans are retreating from Axis (German, Italian, Croatian) forces, offering no resistance. To Italian consternation, it was the Croatian Black Legion that entered Livno first. But fighting on other fronts called the Legion elsewhere, and so Partisans again captured Livno in early December.

Seeing how Black Legion had again thrown a wrench into their plans, after operation “Beta” Italians decided to transfer the operations into Gorski Kotar and Lika. To do this, they transported Chetniks from Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina by train to Knin, formally to reinforce troops fighting against the Partisans. But Francetić was not fooled and suspected that the real purpose of this move was to renew conflict between the Ustashi and the Chetniks, since local Chetniks had allied themselves with the Ustashi against the Communists (which was not the only example of Chetniks doing so). Thanks to these Italian operations which were aimed primarily against the civilians, in late 1942. there is a sudden inflow of Dalmatian Croatians into the Partisans, only for some two-thirds of Dalmatian Partisans to be sent to fronts in Bosnia in early 1943. In order to expel as many Croatians as possible from the areas south of Split, Italians were massively using Chetniks. For this purpose, on 27 February 1943 Italians transported 2 800 Chetniks commanded by Major Bačović from Knin over Split to Dicmo. Once in Dicmo, Chetniks naturally began to pillage and murder their way from Dicmo over Trilj, Zadvarje and Imotski, all the while under close protection of the Italian Air Force.

Partisans had first conquered Jajce on 25.9.1942. by surrounding it with strong forces which cut the city off from other garrisons before attacking the city with strong artillery and mortar fire followed by infantry attack. This will have required several trucks of small arms ammunition and artillery ammunition each, as well as fuel for transport. All of this was procured from unknwon sources. City was defended by the Ustashi and Home Guard forces who surrendered after 18 hours of uninterrupted artillery fire followed by strong attacks. Strength of the Partisan attacks makes it obvious that they had been supplied with heavy weapons and ammunition which they previously did not have in anything approaching the quantities necessary to mount such an attack. As Partisans did not have any significant “victory” against Italian forces in the previous months, it is likely that these weapons along with ammunition and fuel had been “forgotten” somewhere by Italians, along with the trucks.

Part of the Croatian garrison managed to withdraw towards Banja Luka and Travnik. Croatian forces had lost 441 soldier, of which 165 Ustashi and 276 Home Guard troops. Partisans executed any captured Ustashi. Of weaponry, Partisans had captured two 100 mm howitzers, three cannons, five mortars, six machine guns, one armored car, 11 motor vehicles, five locomotives and a large number of rifles and light machine guns. Partisans wrote that they had also captured 50 000 rounds of ammunition, which is in fact a very small quantity of small-arms ammunition: dozen machine guns can exhaust this entire supply in less than half an hour of fighting. Such a small amount of remaining ammunition (some 200 boxes) indicates that some parts of the defensive garrison had likely run out of ammunition during the attack. After the attack, the Partisans executed any captured Ustashi, as well as some 70 civilians. Fall of Jajce was a major blow for morale.

Fall of Jajce and Mrkonjić Grad led to German response, the operation “Jajce”. With little resistance Germans captured Mrkonjić Grad on 2.10.1942., and the Jajce on 4.10.1942. Report of the operational detachment of the 718^th Division from 3.10.1942. notes how the Partisans along the whole front line were putting up very strong restistance, including large-scale counterattacks. It was also noticed how the Partisans were extremely well supplied with weapons and ammunition, and how they managed to withstand strong artillery fire, stubbornly defending every single strongpoint. Germans had absolutely no idea where, being surrounded and with no production of their own, Partisans could have acquired such massive quantities of weapons and ammunition; but they never suspected Italians. As Germans did not have the manpower to keep the town, Partisans retook Jajce on 25.11. In the period from 30.9. to 6.12., Germans carried out three operations against the Partisans in this area, conquering towns in the area multiple times.

In Lika area Partisans planned to take Udbina in October 1942. Udbina was an important crossroads of roads leading towards Donji Lapac, Korenica, Gospić – Vrebačka staza – Lovinac – Gospić, and Gračac – Bruvno – Gračac. As Ustashi and Home Guard troops were present in Udbina, Italians decided to use the Partisans to force Croatian troops out. First Italian move was to pull troops back from the surrounding area so that the Partisans could act without obstacle. First unsuccessful Partisan attack on Udbina had occured earlier, on 3.6.1942. It led to two days of unsuccessful fighting, with 6 dead and 20 wounded Partisans. After the engagement, Italians withdrew from Udbina. Entire Krbava field the Partisans had taken over from the Italians, who themselves had first forbidden Croatian forces from establishing garrisons there before themselves suddenly and without resistance withdrawing from the Partisans, leaving large quantities of weapons and ammunition.

Home Guard and Gendarmerie crews were placed in Udbina, a total of some 400 well armed soldiers. In nearby Gospić, along with command of the Italian “Re” division there was a strong Italian infantry garrison for purposes of defending the city, protecting the railway, as well as protecting the route to sea over Baške Oštrije towards Karlobag. Ustashi forces in Gospić were weak and insufficient to provide any assistance to Udbina without Italian support – which Italians were not willing to provide.

For the night attack of 21/22.8.1942., Partisans assembled 1 251 combatant, a 3:1 advantage in their favor. Defenders soon ran out of ammunition, and depended on aerial resupply from Zagreb. For this purpose, under order of Poglavnik’s Headquarters, 4^th Company (minus 1 platoon) of the 3^rd Lika Ustasha Battalion of the Lika-Krbava Ustasha Regiment from Bihać was airlifted to Udbina on 31.8. and 1.9., under command of the Ustasha Captain Ventur Baljko, who immediately took command in Udbina.

For new attack on Udbina the Partisans prepared 5 battalions, artillery battery (3 mountain guns and 1 howitzer) and a tank platoon (2 tanks). Attacking forces were numerically and in weapons some 5 – 6 times stronger than defenders who were supported by state and allies, while Partisans were being armed in “unknown” manner. More weapons and ammunition the Partisans expended, more they had. In the night attack on 21/22 October Partisans achieved initial successes, but the Ustashi managed to reorganize and repel the attack, inflicting heavy casualties on the Partisans.

Due to unfavorable position – being encircled – Ustashi pulled back from Udbina in late October, estimating how they wouldn’t be able to withstand any stronger attack. During the conquest of Lika, Partisans were attempting to spread out Croatian forces as widely as possible, using terror to start fighting in Western Slavonia. In one such example, in early October 1942 they took the weakly defended village of Šipanovica near Pakrac, burning the church and killing 400 villagers from children to the elderly. The goal was to force Croatian government to transfer forces to this area and thus reduce pressure on Partisans in Lika and Bosnia.

In central Bosnia, Partisans again attacked Livno. Beginning of the attack was slated for midnight of 5 December 1942. But on 4 December from Bugojno to Livno arrived commander of the V Ustasha Active Brigade Rafael Boban with 1^st Company of the 1^st Battalion in strength of 90 men. Boban found Livno in state of panic, with Mayor having run away. But thanks to sudden counterattack by Ustashi, Partisan attack failed.

When Partisans attacked Livno again on 14 December, three Ustashi companies counterattacked towards Šermetove Košare above the village of Kablići. One battalion of the 2^nd Proletariat Brigade had arrived to the village just that morning. Livno itself was defended by a mixed unit of the Ustashi, Home Guard and Gendarmerie, a total of 1 185 men. In the morning of 15 December, commander of the VII Ustashi Battalion sent a telegram to Mostar in which he notified the Command of the 6^th Infantry Division about heavy Partisan attack on Livno during the night, which included firing some 200 artillery rounds. Commander reported that “We have managed to repel them. Some had entered the city but we are not allowing them to retreat. We lack ammunition and if we do not receive resupply today, we will have to withdraw.”. Requested ammunition was sent from Sarajevo by airplane which could not deliver it due to heavy fog. Ustashi ran out of ammunition, and at 13:30 Croatian forces began retreating southwards together with civilians. Partisans entered Livno on the same day at 16:00, after 36 hours of heavy fighting.

According to Partisans’ own reports, they had captured significant supplies, especially ammunition. “Here in Livno we fed well, as well as clothed”, the deputy political comissar of the 2^nd Proletariat Brigade wrote on 22 December 1942. According to Partisans’ own reports, they had captured all heavy weapons of the Livno garrison, as well as significant amounts of ammunition and other material. Seeing how the Ustashi had withdrawn due to lack of ammunition, this report is certainly a lie designed to hide the true source of Partisans’ supplies. In fact, all Communist commanders had standing orders to, upon capture of any larger settlement, report that they had captured significant quantities of weapons and especially ammunition. In case of Livno specifically, Partisans were not only three times more numerous, but also had far more ammunition for infantry weapons and artillery alike, as well as advantage in quantity of personal and heavy weapons alike. Considering the intensity of fighting and the fact that attackers have to use far more ammunition than defenders, Partisans must have spent ten times as much ammunition as the Croatian forces. And this required resupply, which for this quantity will have required a large number of trucks.

In the area of Bihać, Partisans had – in fighting from 2.11. to 4.11.1942. – deployed 8 brigades and destroyed Ustashi – Home Guard garrison in Bihać and nearby places. Movement with purpose of concentration of forces began on 28.10.1942. Units only received attack orders on 1.11., a day before the attack, so as to avoid leaking the plan of the attack. Attack itself began on 2.11. at 21:30, and was such a surprise that lights were still on in the city when the attack began. One battalion managed to infiltrate the city itself, at the right shore of Una. After this, two Partisan brigades captured the entire city during the night with the exception of two fortified cities. Conquest of Bihać connected the Partisan territories in Bosnian Krajina and central Bosnia with their territory in Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun and Banija. This formed the uninterrupted territory from Karlovac to Livno, which Italians were planning to soon take under their control.

After Black Legion had liberated Livno, Jure Francetić on 22 December flew from Zagreb to Gospić where he was to take command of the Operational Area Lika. His aircraft was sabotaged however and crashed into Partisan area near Slunj, where Francetić was soon captured and killed.

Following the defense of Jajce, Partisan 1. Proletariat Division continued towards central Bosnia. This endangered Banja Luka, and because of this threat the headquarters of German 714^th Division reinforced its forces with elements of German 741^st Regiment from the area of Kutina, and until the end of December prevented advance of the Partisan 1^st Division towards the valley of river Bosna. Germans recaptured Jajce on 6 December 1942, while the Partisan 3^rd Division went to attack vital lines of communication in the valleys of Lašva and Bosna. In these operations the Partisans had to use dozens of railway cars worth of ammunition. This quantity could by no means have been delivered by the British – the only possible source of supply were the Italians. Germans should have understood this, but never carried out an investigation for political reasons, and so Mussolini was free to continue using the extremely transparent excuse that the Partisans were acquiring weapons and ammunition from the Croatian Home Guard – which had nothing like the quantity of weapons and ammunition that the Partisans were receiving.

NOTES:

NDH – Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska)

KPJ – Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Komunistička Partija Jugoslavije)

KPH – Communist Party of Croatia (Komunistička Partija Hrvatske)

GOG / COG – Chief Operational Group (Glavna Operacijska Grupa)

NOV and PO – People’s Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments (Narodno Oslobodilačka Vojska i Partizanski Odredi)

OZN / OZNA – Detachment for Protection of People (Odjeljenje za Zaštitu Naroda – postwar Yugoslav secret police)

1943

On 27 January 1943, German emissary in Zagreb expressed his concern about the situation at the bauxite mines near Mostar and warned of danger from Chetniks. German communications officer however reported that the situation near Mostar was completely calm and that there is no danger from the Communists there since the area was in the Chetnik sphere. German command for the Southeast recommended to wait with any action against the Chetniks, since general Roata was emotionally strongly attached to the Chetniks and that only when he is replaced could a strong Italian action against the Chetniks be expected. It is thus clear that Germans were completely clueless about the entire Italian strategy, and were blaming solely general Roata.

In the early 1943, Italians were again plotting how to conquer Bosnia, and thus secretly – as a price of further logistical support – asked Tito to continue advance into central Bosnia, onto the area held by the Germans and the Ustashi, allowing the Italians to come into the area taken by the Partisans and conquer Bosnia. This supposed Italian-German-Croatian operation was called operation WEISS by Germans and the Fourth Enemy Offensive by the Partisans. Italians stopped this operation as soon as they realized that Partisans were unable to penetrate German-Croatian lines. From then on, Italians stopped carrying out any significant actions except for preventing Croatian military from entering the Italian occupational zone. There was even an open conflict over the issue of Chetniks.

Communists then had 9 divisions, of which 5 divisions (1^st and 2^nd Proletariat, 3^rd Strike, 7^th Banate and 9^th Dalmatian). Under command of Croatian Partisan command were two divisions, and another two under Bosnian Partisan command. German estimates placed overall Partisan strength at 65 000 troops, which was more than total strength of Croatian Armed Forces at the time. As it was, Axis simply did not have the force to destroy the Partisans.

German-Croatian offensive began on 20 January 1943 when 7^th SS Division left Karlovac, and 369^th Division left Bosanski Novi. General in the rear Glez Horstenau was supposed to organize evacuation and accomodation for 60 000 prisoners. Plan was to ensure as many captured prisoners as possible to provide workforce for Germany.

Partisans had three possibilities of resistance:

• First possibility was concentration of all forces and defense of the territory of created Communist government due to relatively small enemy forces, which had caused 7^th SS Division to require seven days for advance from Karlovac to Bihać, while Italian forces simply stopped their advance in Lika and didn’t even attempt any further advance.
• Second possibility was dispersal of all forces and slipping through the enemy lines. This was possible considering the small numbers of enemy forces and their dispersed deployment, especially because majority of the Partisans were already outside the encirclement, safe in the Italian zone.
• Third possibility was concentration of all forces inside the encirclement, before withdrawing in front of the enemy in concentrated formations.

Tito, being not too competent, chose the third option. He explained it as a plan of retreating into Serbia across the central and northern Bosnia, and ordered concentration of all the forces. This meant that the Partisans from the Italian zone had to pass through Italian positions and in order to enter the encirclement consisting of Italian, German and Croatian armies. Main Operational Group was created from three elite divisions. General Headquarters of Croatia and Bosnia were both ordered to follow the Chief Operational Group with their troops, serving as a rear guard for the COG and the High Command. However, both Croatian and Bosnian Headquarters refused to carry out these orders as they were convinced they could successfully defend themselves. Tito only managed to place the 7^th Banate and 9^th Dalmatian divisions under his control. In this way he managed to collect five divisions under his command, numbering a total of 21 000 troops. Together with the troops were concentrated military hospitals with 4 000 – 8 000 wounded and typhus patients. These were followed by 50 000 to 80 000 civilians, mostly Croatians, who were ordered to follow the Partisans into the exile. This civilian exodus benefited Partisans in no way, but certainly benefited the Italians who wanted to ethnically cleanse their occupational zone of Croatian population.

Tito ordered a movement towards Serbia, but actual route of Partisan movement made it clear that this goal was a fake one. Had he really wanted to move into Serbia, Tito will have moved through the Italian zone where Italians only controlled major cities – that is, direction of eastern Herzegovina, Sanjak and southern Serbia. But Tito instead opted for a far more dangerous option, breaking through the German – Croatian line. Not only was this line far more solid, but Tito’s Communists had no major support in northern Croatia, nor were there Italians to supply them. In all respects, this option was a far more dangerous one. But Tito’s real purpose was to act as Italians’ advance guard, enabling Italian troops to infiltrate further into northern Bosnia under excuse of pursuing the Partisans. Italians would enter the towns and villages under justification of protecting them from the Partisans – and would then never leave.

First Partisan attempt at breakthrough over Jajce and Bugojno on 27.1. failed, so GOG as well as 7^th and 9^th Divisions turning southwards in panic and moving towards the Neretva valley already on 6.2.1943., while battle on Una was still ongoing. Second Proletariat Division and the 4^th Dalmatian Brigade captured Posušje on the same day. On 10.3.1943. same units captured Imotski, where they killed two people, burned down 39 houses and carried off large quantities of food and cattle. From Imotski they moved eastwards, but were intercepted near Tihaljina by the local village Ustashi (“wild Ustashi”) and local Home Guard forces, all of whom were acting under Italian command. Some 200 Partisans were killed and 800 wounded in this engagement. With the Italian army beginning to engage, Partisans ran away back to Imotski. After a rest of few days in Imotski, Partisans then retreated over Rakitno and Drenice towards Jablanica.

In the west, general Leuters ordered on 12.2.1943. the beginning of the operation “Weiss II”. Aim of the operation was to clean the area between Bosanski Petrovac, Bosansko Grahovo, Livno, Jajce and Ključ. To assist in the German attack, Leuters employed the Italian division “Bergamo” in the south, reinforced by Ustashi forces. These units were to advance from Sinj towards Livno and from Drniš towards Vrbovac. To give Partisans more room to maneuver, Italian 6^th Corps with main base in Mostar abandoned all smaller strongholds around Široki Brijeg, which led to cessation of production of boxite in this area. Because of this, German General Leuters sent 718^th Division along with the Ustashi battlegroup “Bugojno” (1 000 men) and elements of the 2^nd Home Guard Mountain Brigade towards Mostar. One part of the 718^th Division as well as the “Bugojno” battlegroup advanced along the Bugojno – Prozor – Rama road, while the second part of the division as well as the elements of the 2^nd Home Guard Mountain Brigade advanced along the road Sarajevo – Konjic.

To Partisan group gathered around Jablanica Tito ordered turn northwards in order to avoid conflict with Italians. They thus moved back to help Tito, marching towards Neretva which the first groups reached on 16.2.1943. at the stretch Drežnica – Grabovica. Units of the 2^nd Proletariat Division and the 2^nd Dalmatian Brigade took up defensive positions towards Mostar, while the 4^th Dalmatian Division advanced northwards along the western bank of the river, towards Jablanica, which was taken on 22.2.1943. In Jablanica, 100 Italian soldiers surrendered without fighting, and were butchered by the Partisans, who then proceeded to cross Neretva by a bridge. Italian garrison had in fact surrendered on orders of Italian general Amadeo Roata, who thus secured the Partisans the bridge crossing. This way the Partisans from the Italian rear had moved to assist Tito in Bosnia, instead of moving eastwards to Serbia which was Tito’s alleged goal.

Italians surrendered Bradina on 18.2.1943., and with its fall the Ivan Saddle mountain pass held by the Ustashi crew became indefensible and easily fell on 19.2. The only good road led through Konjic, and so the Partisans were planning to send the transport of the General Hospital through it. In Konjic however the Partisans encountered stiff resistance by the German garrison and managed to take only the part of the city on the western shore. Germans attacked Ivan Saddle on 21.2.1943., and took it the following day with Ustasha help, after which they advanced towards Konjic to expel the Partisans from western part of the city.

Impossibility of breakthrough to the north left Tito and the Partisans in a very difficult position. Thus they decided to return towards the Italian positions by attacking towards Prozor. Units of the 3^rd Proletariat Division took Prozor after the short two days of fighting against the “Muge” division. First Partisan attack was in fact easily repulsed, but in the morning General Roata arrived with an armored column and “improves” defenses. Roata pulled the troops back from the elevated positions around the city and concentrated defenses at the outskirts of the city, where the entire defense consisted of the several incorrectly positioned bunkers and four rows of barbed wire. Tanks, artillery and heavy machine guns Roata positioned either at the borders of the town or even within it, preventing them from either acting as mobile reserve or even just providing effective fire support. Defensively, this defense was completely useless.

In the second night attack, and thanks to Roata’s “incorrect” and worthless defensive deployment, three Partisan brigades supported by 6 mountain howitzers managed to destroy defense of 16 tanks, 36 artillery pieces and over a hundred heavy machine guns. Partisans managed to force their way into the city itself, after which their numerical advantage easily overwhelmed the defenders. Prozor (Rama) fell on 20.2.1943., and a day later Partisans also took Ostrožac. This endangered the bauxite mines to the west of Mostar, which were covering 10% of German needs and a quarter of Croatian needs. Italians bravely ran away with heavy casualties, and the division “Murge” essentially ceased to exist as a functional military formation. Partisans captured 12 tanks, 36 cannons, hundreds of automatic weapons (machine guns, SMGs etc.) and over a thousand rifles. In Prozor, as the currently most important battlefield, Italians were keeping 2 000 soldiers. Their main task was protecting 24 railway cars of the ammunition, and enough food to feed their garrison of 2 000 soldiers for four years. All these supplies were located essentially on the Italian first line. This quantity of ammunition was sufficient to provide each Partisan with ten kilograms of ammunition, sufficient for several months of defense (7,92 mm Mauser cartridge weight: 26 g, 10 kg of ammunition: 385 rounds per soldier). Remainder – majority – of the ammunition was buried.

Tanks captured in Prozor Partisans used so long as they had fuel for them, while cannons remained in use until later crossing of Neretva when they were thrown into the river. Of the 24 wagons of ammunition, as noted, smaller quantity was given to troops while majority of ammunition was buried. Later, after the end of the operation, buried ammunition was transferred into other parts of NDH, mostly to Slavonia. This was in fact the reason why General Roata had allowed the mass surrender without destroying the ammunition previously, as this allowed the Partisans to transfer operations (and thus war) to Slavonia.

During this time, two Chetnik brigades under Italian command were given the task of cleaning the terrain to the north and south of Knin. Operation was, according to the plan, supposed to last from 25.2. until 20.3.1943. Officially the purpose of the operation was cleaning the terrain from the Partisans, but in reality, Chetniks were carrying out ethnic cleansing and genocide of the local Croatian population by Italian command, while also pushing the Partisans northwards to enable them to join Tito’s Chief Operational Group (GOG) in pushing back the Croatian forces.

On 26.2.1943. a meeting was held in Rome at Hitler’s request. From the Italian side present were Mussolini and general Ambrozio, while representing the Third Reich were Ribbentrop and general Varlimon. Ambrozio held that the action against the Partisans will fail, and that consequently there is no need for an offensive against the Chetniks. Ribbentrop responded that there could be no further delay in operations against the “pro-British Mihailović’s auxilliaries in Croatia”. In this manner Ambrozio was seeking an excuse to maintain the public alliance with the Chetniks while also avoding participation in any significant operations. Varlimon thus notified Hitler upon returning to Berlin that “Italians will not participate in any of the planned operations”. Only after Ribbentrop’s intervention with Mussolini, general Ambrozio conceded to the planned operations. Hitler called Italian’s stance a treason, as even Ambrozio’s concession was only partial.

Wehrmacht on 28 February 1943. notified the Italian High Command of Hitler’s strict orders, which stated that:

1. German troops are to remain near Mostar, specifically the boxite mines, until the boxite mines began with undisturbed operation.
2. Germans were to finally attack the center of Mihailović’s movement and destroy it. Should Italian forces be unavailable for this operation, it would be carried out by German forces with potential cooperation of Bulgarian and Croatian reinforcements.

In situation where Tito’s GOG had found itself facing complete annihilation due to failure of northwards breakthrough, Italian general Roata panicked. Wishing to help his ally Tito, he withdrew all Italian forces from strongholds in the area stretching from Široki Brijeg to Mostar, which allowed Dalmatian partisans to move into Bosnia and assist the main body of Partisan forces.

On 27.2.1943. Germans attacked on the stretch of Gornji Vakuf – Prozor and repulsed the Partisans. Fall of Prozor meant severing the retreat for the General Hospital as well as death of 4 000 wounded and typhoid Partisans. To head off this danger, Tito sent the 1^st and 2^nd Proletariat Division (sans the 2^nd Dalmatian Brigade) into counterattack. After this followed the third breakthrough attempt across Gornji Vakuf northwards, where all forces – some 7 Partisan brigades – were collected from 2.3. to 5.3.1943. On 2^nd March Germans began the final attack against Partisan positions northward of Gornji Vakuf, in Vilića Gumno. General Partisan counterattack on the Gornji Vakuf frontline began on 3.3.1943., and was carried out by the 9^th Brigade of GOG. On the same day Partisans supported by tanks entered Livno, and held it for two days. Fighting lasted until 5.3.1943., when Germans were thrown back to midway between Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf. While the breakthrough had failed, road towards Prozor had been kept, and so Partisans again attempted a breakthrough across Konjice. Two divisions crossed Neretva near Jablanice and from 6.3. to 15.3. attacked Konjic from both sides of Neretva. Konjic was defended by weak Italian and Croatian forces, but these were soon reinforced by Germans and so Italians failed at losing this position. Despite being far stronger, partisans were repelled, turning around and again crossing Neretva near Jablanica so as to reinforce the attacks near Gornji Vakuf. Since Tito was constantly repeating that they were breaking through towards Serbia, even the common partisans were beginning to notice that “something was rotten in the state of Tito”. It will have been logical for Partisans to cross Neretva and continue towards Serbia. To prevent this possibility, Tito ordered all the bridges to be destroyed, justifying it by protection from Chetnik and Italian attacks from the rear. After destruction of the bridges, Tito convinced his troops that the only remaining choice is the breakthrough northwards.

Gornji Vakuf was being defended by two German battalions and one Ustashi brigade (zdrug). Despite the massive numerical advantage, Communists were repelled and some of their brigades even rebelled and abandoned their positions. This put an end to third attempt at northwards breakthrough into the German zone. Tito now realized how he had overestimated his strength, and that there would be no Italian infiltration into the central and northern Bosnia. He thus looked to save his own neck, and sent a delegation to negotiate truce with Germans. Defeated and broken, Partisans were forced to retreat, with their only escape route being across Neretva and the broken bridge. Tito thus ordered construction of improvised bridge which he himself had ordered destroyed few days earlier – proceeding later to present this bit of stupidity as a genius play of deception. As the improvised bridge could not withstand heavy weaponry, all of it had to be thrown into the river – even the weapons captured from (or rather, gifted by) Italians in Prozor.

To prevent the Chetniks from interfering with Partisan retreat, Italians summoned Draža Mihailović and ordered him to assemble his “Chetnik strike corps” of 7 000 Chetniks and assemble it to east of Neretva, some 15 kilometers from the river, so that Chetniks wouldn’t accidentally prevent rescue of Partisans by crossing Neretva. Of course, Chetniks were convinced that their duty was to prevent Partisans from breaking out, but in reality they were removed from the proximity of the river so they wouldn’t notice Partisan crossing. Had they been patrolling along the shore, they will have noticed works on restoring the bridge.

Units which had crossed the bridge twice already – once attacking Konjic and second time returning from the attack – are now crossing again across the improvised bridge. Crossing lasts from 6^th to 9^th March, while concurrently fighting for Konjic is going on. Partisans were only saved from complete destruction by Italians, who had blocked German advance and prevented them from advancing deeper into Italian zone. Germans were forced to negotiate with the Italian command, and by the time they received Italian permission, Partisans crossed the river unchallenged as there were no Italian, or any other, enemy forces on the opposite side. Chetniks were some 10 – 15 kilometers further away. Italian blockade of advance of the two most powerful German divisions on the Balkans lasted for five days before agreement was reached, after which Germans required another four days to reorganize the divisions and resume their advance. This kept two best German formations out of the battle against the Partisans. Italian justification was that the area was rich in bauxite and that they thus didn’t want to let German units through – as if Germans could have dug the ore during combat. And while Italians were blocking the Germans, in three days the Partisans marched three divisions and Tito across the river, leaving the wounded with the 7^th Division. As the 7^th Division could not transfer the wounded quickly enough, they were left for the 9^th Dalmatian Division which was supposed to cross the river near Kaldrma. As Tito had ordered these bridges to be demolished as well, they had to move towards Jablanica. Transport of the wounded and the typhoid patients lasted from 9.3. to 15.3., after which Italians allowed Germans into their territory.

To justify Italians for their sabotage of previous operations, “Duce” (Mussolini) sent a letter to Hitler on 9 March 1943, in which he put forth the opinion that both the Chetniks and the Partisans were enemies of the Axis; he also discussed this with German Foreign Minister. Mussolini admitted how Italians had, “until now”, armed several thousand Chetniks for a guerilla war against the Communists and that the Chetniks had until now energetically fought aganst the Partisans. But now, on 9.3. Duce commanded that Chetniks were no longer to be given weapons and that they were to be disarmed after the Partisans were defeated. With this Mussolini was attempting to remove doubts in his loyalty to Hitler while also hiding his true long-term strategic plans. While Mussolini did indeed want to disarm the Chetniks and the Partisans in the long run, this was only to happen after he conquered entire Croatia. To reinforce Mussolini’s statement, a conflict between Chetniks and Partisans occured on 14 March in the Knin area. Conflict, initiated by the Italians, was started to try and chase away the Partisans that did not submit wholly to Tito. End result was 140 dead and 40 captured on both sides.

Following thus Mussolini’s order, the Chetnik alliance with Italians was temporarily suspended, at least officially. By order from Rome, Italians ceased all deliveries of weapons and ammunition and began arresting Mihailović’s men.

At the same time as the operation Weiss, in the Velebit area some places are held by the Ustashi and the Home Guard troops as here Croatia has access to the sea according to agreement with Italy. Karlobag is the center of the Croatian forces in the Operational Area Lika. In order to relieve Tito’s forces in Bosnia and improve his circumstances, Partisans attacked Gospić, with fighting continuing even during the next German operation “Schwarz”. Partisans are being secretly assisted by Italians, who have withdrawn from Gospić to improve Partisan positions. Italian 5^th Army Corps retreated from Lika towards the Croatian shore. As a part of withdrawal, in the period from 4^th to 21^st March Italian division “Re” abandoned Lovinac, Medak, Gospić and Perušić, leaving defense to units of Croatian Armed Forces commanded by Operational Area Lika so that the Partisans would be able to act freely and expel surrounded Croatian forces. Partisans had cut off any communication with Zagreb, and two Partisan brigades captured Slunj on 7.4.1943.

Before this attack, Partisans had prepared attack by three brigades of the 6^th Division of NOV PO HR on Lovinac, Sveti Rok and Raduč on 14.3.1943. For the attack they had acquired large quantities of ammunition. Before the operation Italians pulled back their garrisons to island of Pag. Under the attack of the 1^st Brigade of the 6^th Partisan Division, Ustashi garrison abandoned Sveti Rok on 15^th March, retreating to Lovinac. Partisan 9^th Brigade captured the railway station of Raduč, after which they attacked Lovinac. At the same time the 2^nd Brigade was preventing assistance from Gospić and Medak. During the fighting which lasted until 19^th March, Partisans had failed at taking Lovinac, and had suffered heavy losses in the process – 37 dead, 108 wounded and 2 missing. In follow-up actions units of the 6^th Lika Division also had no success. Attacks on Medak on 22^nd and 23^rd March as well as on Brušane from 25^th to 26^th March were unsuccessful. Partisans captured Ramljane, Ličko Lešće and Janče on 1^st and 2^nd April, capturing also the 3^rd Lika Watch Battalion which severed the link between Otočac and Gospić. Otočac itself fell on 12^th April. After this, on 7^th and 8^th April, the 2^nd Brigade of 6^th Division unsuccessfully attacked Široka Kula which is being held by a Home Guard company of the 9^th Recruit Battalion. In repeated attacks and with fresh reinforcements, Partisans captured Kula on 20^th April. Following these successes, Partisans concentrated their efforts on conquest of villages south of Gospić. Bilaj, Ribnik and Medak were taken on 22^nd onto 23^rd of April. Fast collapse of the units of Independent State of Croatia near Bilaje, Ribnik and Medak led to 31^st and 32^nd Home Guard Battalion abandoning Perušić and Lički Osik on their own initiative due to insufficient supply of ammunition and massive enemy numerical advantage.

The only link for Gospić remained a road towards Karlobag. At this road, Italians did their best to prevent movement of Croatian forces by making up various excuses for not providing any military, logistical or transport assistance. Help from Zagreb could arrive by airplane, or by road over Ljubljana or Rijeka. But as Italians were doing their best to slow the road travel down, even travel of individual officers could last for days. Officers sent from Zagreb were, before the trip, warned not to conflict with Italians. Ustashi officer Josip Hubl wrote in his war diary that “We were crossing new Italian territory. On the way we had major problems because we allegedly did not have proper papers. We were stopped in Ljubljana, and our consul barely managed to secure permission to continue our trip on 23.2.”.

Loss of bridges and retreat of the 31^st and 33^rd Home Guard battalions also meant the loss of an air strip northeast of Gospić which supplied the city. General attack by Partisans on 28^th and 29^th April completely destroyed the 2^nd Jaeger Battalion, 34^th Battalion and the 1^st Battalion of the 12^th Home Guard Infantry Regiment. On the next day the Partisans captured Lički Novi and Oštra, and pushed back the 32^nd Battalion. Gospić was now completely surrounded.

Main attack on Gospić began on 2^nd May at 19:00. Six Partisan brigades, numbering a total of 15 000 men, attacked the city defended by 1 500 defenders. Commander of the defense of Gospić was Croatian Home Guard Major Delko Bogdanić. During the heavy fighting which lasted until 5 in the morning of the 3^rd May, Partisans had heavy losses – between 5 000 and 6 500 dead and wounded – but could not conquer Gospić. Because of this the 1^st Corps of NOV and PO of Croatia ordered cessation of attempts to conquer Gospić. Only the Partisan 6^th Division was left near Gospić, besieging the town until 30^th May.

The battle for relief of Gospić began on 30^th May. Battalions of the Pag Brigade left from direction of Lukovo Šugarje and Karlobag in two columns designated “Velebit” and “Karlobag”. Remainder of the 9^th Battalion left Gospić on 31^st May. In the quick advance and heavy fighting Croatian forces quickly broke the resistance of brigades of the Sixth Partisan Division. During these battles, units of the Sixth Division were pushed back from the Gospić – Karlobag road and the Partisan blockade of Gospić was broken.

Following the unsuccessful attempt at destroying the Partisans and the Chetniks in the operation “Weiss”, German commander for the Southeast, General von Leer, decided to carry out operation “Schwarz” which was personally approved by Hitler on 30^th March 1943. As Mihailović’s close connections to Italian military were well known (unlike Tito’s), Hitler emphasized the need to conceal true German intentions towards the Chetniks. Hitler himself was increasingly convinced that Italians were cooperating with the Chetniks because they wanted to change the side and use Chetnik’s connections to the British to join the Allies themselves. As both the Partisans and the Chetniks were growing in power thanks to Italian deliveries of weapons and ammunition, German High Command for the Southeast reported on 14^th March that the operation Schwarz cannot begin before early May. One option considered was to request Chetniks to surrender their weapons and begin the attack after their refusal. Operation itself would be preceded by an air strike against Mihailović’s headquarters. According to German general Jodl, primary goal of the new operation was to “After destruction of the Communist Tito’s state it is necessary to destroy Serbian nationalist forces under Draža Mihailović in order to secure the rear areas in case of Allied landings in the Adriatic”.

Operation Schwarz began in May with attack against the forces of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland (that is, the Chetniks). Draža Mihailović himself was with his headquarters located in the Italian-controlled Montenegro. Because Germans had prepared the operation in secret, Italians were unable to warn Tito about the operation. Tito, believing himself safe, remained at the Durmitor plateau between the rivers of Tara and Piva. Tito’s own intelligence service was geared primarily towards counterespionage, and especially towards spying on Partisans who were suspected of being German or Italian spies, of being politically incorrect or ideologically undesireable (e.g. Andrija Hebrang Sr., who was murdered after the war in 1949), or otherwise suspect. Other duty of Tito’s intelligence was assessing the mood and attitude of civilians in Yugoslavia, and finding potentially troublesome influential individuals for elimination. Military espionage against the enemy forces was completely neglected and Tito was in this respect relying entirely on Italian reports. Draža Mihailović however, unlike Tito, actually had a functioning military intelligence and was thus able to notice massive concentrations of German forces and escape the encirclement before it was even properly formed.

In the encirclement formed in March were some 15 000 Partisans according to German sources or 16 000 according to Partisan sources. Tito did not expect any kind of attack as he was expecting arrival of German intelligence officer Hans Otto for further negotiations. Because of that he believed that Germans were attacking Chetniks only, and not the Partisans.

German 369^th Division continued cleaning the terrain around Foča. In Montenegro on 11^th May the Communist attack on Bijelo Polje was repelled. Italian Command gradually reached the conclusion that Tito’s cooperation with Roata is invalid since Partisans were attempting a breakthrough towards the sea, and not northwards.

Following the defeat of General Rommel in Africa, Chetniks began to realize how war is turning in the favor of Western Allies and are handing out leaflets which are discussing the Chetnik decision to call the people into great liberation struggle against Germans, Italians and Croats. Chetniks planned to attack Germans west of Andrijevica, but Germans captured Chetnik chief Pavle Đurišić. Italians requested his release, even threatening to liberate him by force.

Operation “Schwarz”, planned before German defeat in North Africa, began in Montenegro on 17^th May. Partisans called it the “5^th Enemy Offensive”.

Realising he has been surrounded, and to improve his position in southeastern Bosnia, Tito ordered attacks against Germans wherever possible. Partisans thus organized fighting in Slavonia to stretch out German forces as much as possible. From the previous temporary Partisan capture of Prozor Slavonian partisans were armed with weapons captured in Prozor, and after the start of the new German offensive they returned to Slavonia where they intensified operations. For Tito, important matters were to arm as many Serbs as possible and to capture food for Dalmatian and Bosnian Partisans. In order to transfer fighting to Slavonia, Tito – now surrounded in the area of Durmitor – changed his strategy. Instead of transferring whole divisions and capturing individual cities as Italians wanted, Tito ordered transfer of smaller combat capable units with large quantities of weapons captured in Prozor, with which he armed local Partisans and mobilized new troops.

Partisans spent next two months attempting to break through the encirclement. Italians, surprised by Tito’s moves, refused to cooperate. Near Kalinovik, German 118^th Division disarmed a large number of Chetniks after weak resistance. Meanwhile the 369^th Division captured Čajniče which Partisans had destroyed and burned down before retreating. Immediately afterwards Germans also captured Kolašin. According to German intelligence reports, Tito’s Headquarters were located 20 km from Žabljak, while that of Draža Mihailović was southeast of Bijelo Polje.

For Tito, this new operation came as a complete surprise since neither Italian general Roatta nor his successor general Roboti knew of it. Italians thus could not inform Tito of the operation, and Tito himself had signed a peace agreement with Germans. In fact, even as fighting was ongoing for Gornji Vakuf during the Operation Weiss, Josip Broz himself sent a delegation to Germans, offering a ceasefire and alliance with Germans against the Chetniks as well as against the Allied invasion. (It should be noted that the first contact between Tito and Germans had happened already in late 1942., for purposes of prisoner exchage. This contact was established with the help of German engineer and a dedicated Nazi Hans Otto, who after the war was Tito’s advisor and accomplice in establishment of OZN / OZNA). Germans wanted to use the offer, and as a proof of honest intents they required cessation of Partisan attacks against rail transport in Slavonia. Because of this Tito ordered transfer of units from Slavonia into Bosnia across Sava. This order was rescinded as soon as the Operation Weiss had ended, and Slavonian Partisans – now reinforced by Partisans from Bosnia and armed with weapons captured in Prozor – returned to Slavonia, but now with strict orders not to attack German trains and railways transport eastwards.

After crossing Neretva in the previous operation (Weiss), Partisans broke the Chetniks in eastern Herzegovina before proceeding to attack Chetniks with the aim of breaking through to the Adriatic Sea. There Tito was expecting Allied landings, from whom he expected help in weaponry but without actual invasion. For this purpose Tito turned towards Kolašin and Sandžak where he could move early in the next year, as there was nothing preventing him from doing so except weak Italian forces that were his allies anyway. However, Germans soon arrived to Kolašin, having decided to terminate the agreement with the Communists. Main Partisan operational group had restored its strength to some 15 000 to 16 000 Partisans, but was now again faced with destruction.

When he realized he had found himself in encirclement again, Tito panicked and became indecisive. His orders became confused: Partisans first attempted a breakthrough eastwards across Limo, then southwards between Mateševo and Podgorica, and then northward across Foča. None of these attempts succeeded, and on 25.4. German general Luters ordered tightening of the perimeter. On 28.4. Partisans attempted a breakthrough northwest through Sutjeska river valley, but with no success.

In Montenegro elements of Partisans attempted a breakthrough southwards, attacking Chetnik positions north and east of Nikšić. These attacks were repulsed with Italian support, as Italians did not want the Partisans to move to Adriatic but rather northwards. Italian military formations from Bileć refused German offer of 16^th May for joint operations against the Chetniks. In fact, just before the arrival of the SS division, Chetniks withdrew with Italian help – Italians having provided their own uniforms and trucks to disguise Chetnik escape. Italians had now realized that Chetniks were their only remaining allies, while Germans themselves focused their attacks against the Chetniks since they knew that Communist Partisans would never support the invasion by capitalistic Western Allies.

In the attempt to penetrate and escape the encirclement, Partisans attacked Foča on 25^th May with six brigades, a total of some 6 000 men. Germans on 26^th May learned that Tito was with his headquarters some 14 kilometers east of Žabljak, in the Tara valley. In Mratinje on 3^rd June, Tito, surrounded, decided to divide his forces. Tito himself, with the elite 1^st and 2^nd Divisions, marches for Bosnia while sending 3^rd and 7^th Divisions with hospital and 4 000 wounded to move into Sanjak. The move into Sanjak failed.

In Montenegro, pressure on German positions of Lieutenant Colonel Gertler in the area of Tjenište began on 3^rd June and does not stop. Bridge over Drina at Foča is destroyed due to high water levels on 4^th June. On 5^th June Partisans are attempting to penetrate German positions by superior force, intending to reach Kalinovik through Popov Most. Battlegroup of Major General Ludviger crossed Tara. German Air Force attacked Partisan targets in the area of Mratinje, Tjenište and Suha (all in borderlands area of BiH, Montenegro and Serbia).

In Montenegro Partisans on 10^th June brough reinforcements from the East across Piva. They also managed to penetrate front of the 369^th Division in one place. But bridge at Sutjeska was destroyed, and Partisans suffered heavy human and material losses. In the fifth breakthrough attempt, Koča Popović managed, on his own initiative, to break through with his division towards Balinovac. After him, through this breach the remainder of Partisans exfiltrated towards Zelengora. After this, Tito with General Headquarters moved towards Rataj, Miljevina and Jahorina. In this breakthrough some 700 heavily wounded Partisans were abandoned, while the 3^rd Division was completely destroyed. Of the 9^th Dalmatian Division, only the 3^rd Dalmatian Brigade had survived. One division managed to pass through stretched German lines, and on 8^th June they crossed Sutjeska. They were followed by the General Headquarters, thanks to resistance of the 2^nd Dalmatian Brigade which was destroyed at Bare protecting Tito’s escape. After this, Tito ordered 3^rd and 7^th Division to abandon the wounded and the hospital and to follow him, but this order came too late and only the remnants of the 7^th Division managed to break through. They were received in Bosnia and Croatia by the completely intact units of the Bosnian Headquarters (4^th and 5^th Division) and the Croatian Headquarters (6^th and 8^th Divisions) which had refused to obey the General Headquarters’ order to concentrate the forces at the beginning of the Weiss operation. After a full year Tito is where he had allegedly moved to Serbia, but really in campaign against northern parts of Croatia in mid-1942. Along the way he had lost some 2/3 of his troops as well as 50 000 to 80 000 accompanying civilians which are nowhere mentioned any more after reaching Livno.

During the two months of fighting, in attempts to break out of the encirclement and the Operation Schwartz, Partisans had had some 11 000 to 12 000 dead, missing or wounded, as well as 2 000 captured soldiers. In addition, they had left behind some 4 000 patients at Sutjeska.

According to general Rudolf Luters, in the Operation Schwartz the Axis forces had 583 dead, while the Partisans had 7 489 killed in combat and some 4 000 – 5 000 dead due to hunger or disease. Only 5 000 Partisans had survived, and this solely thanks to Italian capitulation which forced Germans to cancel the operation. Germans had managed to capture 10 cannons, 6 antitank cannons, 32 heavy and 25 light mortars (minethrowers), 47 heavy machine guns, 173 light machine guns, and 3 608 rifles. Far greater quantity of weaponry was buried, but Chetniks found it by questioning the prisoners. Since Partisans had thrown all the trucks, cannons and heavy weapons into the river during the crossing, Germans could have asked where did they so quickly replace these losses. Partisans could not have captured it from the Ustashi and the Home Guard (the usual Italian excuse), as there were no Croatian units in the operation. Chetniks usually did not attack Germans and Italians, so they had no need for artillery. As there were no battles between Partisans and Italians in this period, the only possibility is that Italians had left a dozen trucks with ammunition as well as mortars and artillery in some village before retreating.

German forces on 12^th June tightened the ring west of Piva, capturing Tjenište after overcoming stiff resistance. In many villages numerous typhus victims were recorded (likely due to presence of Partisans, who were even called “Typhoids” by the populace). In area of Žagubica it was noticed how English aircraft were throwing “packages” to the Chetniks. Majority of the Partisans forces, which had remained within the encirclement, were destroyed by 14^th June. Large mass graves were found as well as the entire villages completely wiped out by typhus, full of typhus’ victims corpses.

As part of the operation “Schwartz”, remaining Chetniks in the Italian zone – in the area of Montenegro and Sanjak – were all disarmed. These had been mobilized into the so-called “Voluntary anti-Communist Militia” (Milizia Volontaria Anti-Comunista – MVAC). Operation “Schwartz” was officially ended on 15^th June (35 days after Rommel’s defeat in Africa), even though conflicts in the other parts of the battlefield had intensified. On the same day near Sokoc the Partisans had attacked an Ustashi unit. Operation Schwartz was the largest operation until then, as well as the last operation on such a scale, but it was finished only in the Montenegro area. In the other areas of Bosnia and Slavonia operations continued, but destruction of the Partisans failed mostly due to capitulation of Italy which meant that Germans had to quickly take over the Adriatic coast all the way to Greece and disarm the Italian troops to prevent them from surrendering all their equipment to the Partisans.

In Montenegro on 23^rd June Italian divisions “Venezia” and “Perugia” fought against the remaining Partisans that had managed to hide from the Germans, killing 18 and capturing 17. Since there were no local Chetniks under Italian command and Tito was no longer cooperating with Italian wishes, they had to fight themselves. Italians were still following their secret strategy despite the increasingly obvious fact that they were losing the war, perhaps hoping they will be allowed to keep Dalmatian shore should they change the allies. Consequently, in Montenegro, as a response to murder of Italian officers in the area of Berane – Podgorica – Nikšić, some 150 captured Partisans were shot. Partisans were slowly turning from Italian ally into a serious enemy.

In battles following the Operation Schwarz the Black Legion suffered heavy losses in combat against the Partisan operational group which had managed to infiltrate eastern Bosnia. Legion lost several places and during the next months fought many difficult battles against the Chetniks and the Partisans. By August the number of soldiers in the Legion had been further reduced as the 23^rd and the 28^th Battalion were detached to help form the 13^th SS “Handzar” division.

American and British forces invaded Sicily on 11^th May, changing the entire geostrategic picture of the Balkans.

In Rome, for the first time since the beginning of the war the Great Council of the Fascist Party met. At this meeting the vote of no confidence to Mussolini was made. At the same day when Mussolini was replaced, near Split on the Mosor mountain Italian operation “Biokovo – Mostar” had ended. This operation had utilized 15 000 Italian solders against some 500 Partisans. Since Partisans had ran away in time, operation ended in looting and burning the villages and murdering the civilians. Next days the Italians burned villages and stole food all across Dalmatia, with the goal of forcing as many civilians into the Partisans. This was done partly because Italians had still not abandoned their long-term strategic goal of annexing Croatian shore, and partly because they preferred people fighting for Yugoslavia to those fighting for independent Croatia.

Allies – one British and one Canadian division – landed in southern Italy on 3^rd August 1943 at 7:30, near Reggio Calabria. Italy signed capitulation on the same day, and declared it five days later. Partisans immediately began the conquest of Dalmatia, and in order to prevent the Croatian Army from doing the same, they attempted to spread it out by carrying out terrorist actions across the entire territory of Independent State of Croatia. In one example, Partisans captured weakly defended Zrin near Kostajnica where they murdered 160 civilians, expelled remaining 850 and burned down the place. They could intensify their actions largely thanks to weapons and ammunition that Roata was leaving for them.

Germans concluded on 17^th August that the Italians will soon evacuate the entire Croatian shore. German forces would then tie Croatian shore to NDH, in the process tying Croatia itself closer to Germany. In reality however they had no intention of turning over Croatian shore to the Ustashi and Home Guard forces. In return, Germans expected Croatia to give up Srijem, which was reaching Belgrade, in order to mollify Croatian – Serbian relations. This would stabilize the government of Milan Nedić relative to the Chetniks.

Tensions between Germany and Italy rose significantly on 7^th September since Germans were increasingly aware that Italy was about to surrender, and were thus taking countermeasures. Germans estimated that “cooperation with Croatia will be even more important should Italy leave the war, and it is very important to maintain relations with Poglavnik. To increase self-confidence of the Croatian Army, it is recommended that German military instructors should show goodwill and learn at least few words of the Croatian language. In order to emphasize the common struggle, it is necessary to award Croatian officers far more German orders [medals]”.

In order to get a hold of at least some Italian weapons, some Ustashi units attacked Italian garrisons. At the very day of Italy’s surrender, Croatian army attacked the fortress of Klis, which is being jointly defended by combined forces of Mussolini’s fascists and Tito’s antifascists. While Croatian forces managed to sieze some weaponry, Germans demanded it to be surrendered, showing clealry that they did not want to allow the formation of truly strong Croatian army which could operate independently.

Following the capitulation of Italy, Germans occupied the former Italian zone in NDH with five army corps. German commanders suspected that many Croatian Home Guard units might defect to Western Allies if given the chance, and are thus attempting to place as many Croatian units as possible under German direct control, using German instructors and commanders for this purpose. German commanders also feared the unification of all Communist forces in the area of Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and Greece, with defense of the Adriatic being the most important so that the Allies could not land there. Germans also were now ascribing increased importance to wheat from Slavonia and Srijem, as well as factories, mines and oil fields. Local German commanders estimated that Croatians were not Russophiles, but that they could defect to the Western Allies. Consequently, Germans stubbornly – ever since Rommel’s defeat in Africa – prevented Croatian armed forces from reaching the Croatian shore and islands. In these areas they actually preferred temporary control by the Communist Partisans, who did not want the arrival of Western Allies. Because of this, they allowed the Partisans to maintain control of Dubrovnik for a time, while Germans gradually advanced towards the shore and the islands, disarming the Italians and keeping Croatian troops behind them.

Conclusion

While antifascist movement will have appeared in Yugoslavia anyway, it is clear that it could only have been so successful because of the Italian support. Tito’s antifascists were the best and most reliable allies that Italian fascists had in Yugoslavia, and reverse is also true. Moreover, Tito’s fraudelent reputation for military excellence was built on Italian intelligence support as well as achievments of more capable subordinates.

NOTES:

NDH – Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska)

KPJ – Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Komunistička Partija Jugoslavije)

KPH – Communist Party of Croatia (Komunistička Partija Hrvatske)

GOG / COG – Chief Operational Group (Glavna Operacijska Grupa)

NOV and PO – People’s Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments (Narodno Oslobodilačka Vojska i Partizanski Odredi)

OZN / OZNA – Detachment for Protection of People (Odjeljenje za Zaštitu Naroda – postwar Yugoslav secret police)